Formal Verification and Synthesis for Quality-of-Service in On-Chip Networks

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Motivation

- On-chip networks due to scaling
 - Intel Teraflops Research chip
 - 80 simple cores
 - Tilera TILE-Gx100
 - 100 general purpose cores
 - Intel Single-Chip cloud computer
 - 48 IA cores
- Significant Cost/Performance considerations
- Complex to reason about
 - Arbitration -- including unfair policies
 - Reservations
- State of the art for Quality of Service (QoS)
 - Reasoning through extensive simulation
 - Analytical techniques in some simple cases
 - Can we do better with formal methods?



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Thesis Statement

Leverage model checking for solving NoC QoS latency problems. Address capacity limitations by extending well-known formal techniques including abstraction and compositional reasoning into the NoC domain

- This talk concerns 3 specific QoS contributions
 - Workload abstraction of traffic models
 - Latency proofs by property strengthening
 - Optimal buffer sizing for QoS

Compositional

'erification

atencv

Outline

- Background
 - <u>xMAS: Formal model of NoC</u>
 - Verification technology
- Compositional latency verification
 - Abstraction and traffic modeling
 - Inductive proof by property strengthening
- Buffer sizing using counterexamples

xMAS Modeling Language

Executable Microarchitectural Specifications (xMAS)

• Represent communication fabrics as compositions of kernel primitives [Chatterjee et al., HLDVT'10]



Why use xMAS Formalism?

- Effective abstraction for real designs
 - Expressive enough to model interesting behaviors
 - Hides messy details of arbitrary RTL
- Finite set of primitives allows reuse of reasoning
- Convenient entry point for verification tools
 - RTL or UCLID modeling language
 - Can augment xMAS with arbitrary sequential logic as needed

Formal Verification / Model Checking

- Model checking
 - Given a finite state model with initial state(s), inputs and transition relation
 - Formally check whether any sequence of inputs can drive the model to a bad state
- Used when bugs are unacceptable
 - Safety-critical applications
 - VLSI designs
- Adoption limited by lack of appropriate models, and inability to scale

Model Checking an xMAS network

- SAT-based verification using And-Inverter-Graphs (AIGs)
- State-of-the-art model checking engines in ABC [Brayton and Mishchenko, CAV'10]
 - Bounded Model Checking (BMC)
 - Induction / K-induction
 - Property directed reachability (PDR) [Een and Mishchenko, IWLS'11]
 - ABC's Implementation of IC3 [Bradley VMCAI'11]
- VeriABC converts verilog to AIG [Long et al.,IWLS'11]

Model Checking an xMAS network

- Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solving
 - An approach for coping with state explosion
 - Decide validity of term-level formulas
- UCLID model checker [Bryant et al., CAV'02]
 - Verifier for systems expressed in a combination of logical theories
 - Symbolic simulation
 - SMT solving as the underlying engine

Verifying Latency Bounds

- xMAS network \mathcal{N}
- Denote latency property Φ
- Property for global latency bound T

 $\Phi_T^G :\approx \mathbf{G}\left(\mathit{src} \implies \mathbf{F}^{< T} \mathit{sink}\right)$

- A "prompt-LTL" property [Kupferman et al. '09]

• Goal is to verify $\mathscr{N} \models \Phi_T^G$



Checking Latency as Simple Safety Property

- Represent latency since injection as age of packet
 - Global clock (n-bit counter)
 - Injection timestamps on packets (widen queue slots by n-bits)



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Compositional Latency Verification

- Size of interesting latency problems
 - 10s or 100s of cycles
 - Similar number of queues
- Without compositional reasoning, verification difficulty grows with both
 - Beyond scope of current tools
- We give two approaches to compositional latency verification of NoC

Related Work



- Model checking to verify of Router Latency [Krishna et al. Haifa '11]
- Static Timing Analysis of combinational circuits
 - Use graph as abstraction of gate-level timing

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Traffic Abstraction

- Decompose both model and property
- Reduce scope of verification problem by focusing on one router in isolation
- Abstract rest of network into precise environment model

Daniel Holcomb, Bryan Brady, and Sanjit A. Seshia. **Abstraction-Based Performance Analysis of NoCs**. In *Proceedings of the Design Automation Conference (DAC)*, pp. 492–497, June 2011.

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~holcomb/dac11-noc.pdf



Abstraction Enables Formal Approach



Abstraction Enables Formal Approach



Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS

Abstraction Enables Formal Approach



Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS



Contributions

- Precise abstraction for formal NoC analysis
 - Extension of network calculus [Cruz, Tran. Info Theory '91]
- Inferring traffic model from simulation data
- Verifying performance using inferred traffic models



Inferring Formal Traffic Model

- Inferred from RTL simulation
 - CMP router [Peh PhD Thesis 2002]
 - Random samples from PARSEC traces
 [Soteriou et al., MASCOTS 2006]
- Predicates on channel behaviors
 - Boolean constraints
 - Conjunctions of rate constraints



Inferring Formal Traffic Model



Applying Formal Traffic Model

- Non-deterministic choice of allowed destinations
- Rate constraints in xMAS enforced by token-bucket regulation of non-deterministic sources
 - Size of token bucket (σ) constrains traffic bursts
 - Token injection frequency (ρ) constrains long-time average rate (1/ρ)



Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS

Traffic modeling -- Conclusions

• UCLID Symbolic Simulation – SMT theory of Bitvectors

	•				
	Simple	Model	Fortified Model		
Node <i>i</i>	Runtime	Latency	Runtime	Latency	
	[seconds]	[cycles]	[seconds]	[cycles]	
0,0	2160	18	3083	15	
1,1	7626	23	17454	20	
2,2	5413	24	4444	24	
3,3	12060	24	16014	23	
4,4	2851	25	4880	24	
$5,\!5$	5848	24	18555	20	
6,6	6486	24	9927	23	
7,7	3372	17	4468	14	
Non-Det	1621	25	1621	25	

- 30 cycle BMC with traffic model for sources and eager sinks



Runtimes using Boolector 1.4.1 as solver [Brummayer & Biere '09]

Traffic model leads to tighter verified latency bounds

Summary of Approach

- One strategy for compositional reasoning
 - Decompose both model and latency property along router boundaries
 - Traffic models as interface specs
- Limitations
 - Finding router latency bound is brute force
 - Bounded model checking for local proofs
 - Traffic abstraction has no guarantee of soundness
- Limitations addressed in next work
 - Automated, sound compositions
 - Inductive proofs of latency

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Compositional Verification

- Strengthen latency property with subgoals
- Reduce required unrolling
- Make latency bounds inductive
- Orders of magnitude speedup

Daniel Holcomb, Alexander Gotmanov, Michael Kishinevsky, and Sanjit A. Seshia. **Compositional Performance Verification of NoC Designs**. In *Proceedings of the 10th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Formal Methods and Models for Codesign (MEMOCODE)*, July 2012.

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~holcomb/memocode12-noc.pdf



Scalability of Induction

- Inductive proofs are efficient because of reduced unrolling
 - No model decomposition

$$p(s_i) \wedge R(s_i, s_{i+1}) \implies p(s_{i+1})$$
$$\left(\bigwedge_{i \in [j, j+k-1]} p(s_i) \wedge \bigwedge_{i \in [j, j+k-1]} R(s_i, s_{i+1})\right) \implies p(s_{j+k})$$

- <u>Two challenges:</u>
 - General initial state
 - Proof may require large k

Auxiliary Invariants

- Auxiliary invariant Ψ blocks off unreachable states from verifier
 - Helps restrict general initial state to good states
 - Otherwise can include deadlock
- Simplicity of xMAS enables helps create Ψ
 - Numeric invariants [Chatterjee et al., CAV'10]
 - Channel persistency [Gotmanov et al., VMCAI'11]
 - Structural queue invariants



Verifying Global Latency Bounds

Prove end-to-end latency of 21 cycles

$$\Phi_{21}^G := \bigwedge_{used_i} age(q_i) < 21$$

Strengthened with auxiliary invariant

 $\mathscr{N} \vDash \Phi_{21}^G \land \Psi$

Induction depth k is too large to be of much use



Strengthening Latency Property

- Strengthen property with Age Lemmas
 - Impose "stage graph" onto xMAS network
 - Precise composable subgoals
- Each age lemma ϕ_i defined by:
 - *t_j* Precise age bound for stage j
 - =True iff packet in slot i maps to stage j $p_{i,j}$

 $d_i = max time$



$$\mathscr{N} \models \Phi^G \land \Psi \land \Phi^L$$

$$\phi_j := \bigwedge_i (p_{i,j} \implies age(q_i) < t_j)$$
 $\Phi^L := \bigwedge_j \phi_j$

 $T_L := \max_{j \in stages}(t_j)$ $\Phi^L \Longrightarrow \Phi^G_T$

> 0.37s, k=4 VS 8.70s, k=20

Why Compositional?

<u>Global bound:</u> Induction depth proportional to worst-case latency

<u>Compositional:</u> Induction depth proportional to size of subgoal





Tightness of Bound from Stage Graph?

- Age lemmas are conservative with respect to time at each stage of progress
 – But how loose is implied bound T₁?
- Use BMC to disprove smaller latency bounds
 - Sweep to find largest disprovable
 - Conservative estimate of slack



Timing Implications of xMAS Transfer Signals



Timing Implications of xMAS Transfer Signals

Idea: reason about future readiness of signals in way that is analogous to current readiness of Boolean signals



Future Readiness Bounds

- Want to reason about future readiness time of irdy/trdy
 - Depends on network state
- Represent conditionally:
 - D(trdy) = { $\langle g_0, \delta_0 \rangle, \langle g_1, \delta_1 \rangle, ..., \langle g_N, \delta_N \rangle$ }
 - g_i is a conjunction of queue predicates
 - δ_i is a numeric bound on readiness from state satisfying g_i

$$g_i \implies \mathbf{F}^{<\delta_i} trdy$$

- Rule-based propagation
 - Analogous to Boolean transfer formulas for current readiness in xMAS
 - Manipulated using operations Max,Plus,ITE



Deriving Progress Lemmas



Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS

Deriving Progress Lemmas



Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS

Credit Loop Network



Trading Looseness against Runtime



Non-Stalling Ring Interconnect



Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS

Non-Stalling Ring Interconnect





Formal Verification and Synthesis for NoC QoS

Receive Reservation in Ring

• Livelock prevention to ensure finite latency [Mattina et al]

• Fair ingress admission with respect to packets on the rings



Receive Reservation in Ring



Naïve Stage Graph of Ring



Toward Acyclic Stage Graph for Ring

Product automaton of ring and reservation logic



Stage Graph for 3-Agent Ring



Ring Verification Results

- Prove 79 cycle bound in 10 frames of induction
- Proved bound is 1 cycle loose
- Speedup of 65x to >130x

find	Runtime (s)	Frames	Cex	Engine	Property
bound T_{FEAS}	24.12	20	Y	bmc	Φ^G_{17}
$\equiv 18$	868.28	200	-	bmc	Φ^G_{18}
	Runtime (s)	Frames	Proved	Engine	Property
verify	62.34	18	Y	kind	$\Phi^G_{19} \wedge \Psi$
bound T_I	1.31	4	Y	kind	$\Phi^G_{19} \wedge \Psi \wedge \Phi^L \wedge \Theta$
$\equiv 19$	88.39	12	Y	pdr	$\Phi^G_{19} \wedge \Psi$
	6.57	14	Y	pdr	$\Phi^G_{19} \wedge \Psi \wedge \Phi^L \wedge \Theta$

find	Runtime (s)	Frames	Cex	Engine	Property
bound	3901.95	80	Y	bmc	Φ^G_{77}
$\equiv 78$	10,000.00	111	-	bmc	Φ^G_{78}
	Runtime (s)	Frames	Proved	Engine	Property
verify bound $\equiv T_L$ $\equiv 79$	10,000.00	-	-	kind	$\Phi^G_{79} \wedge \Psi$
	75.28	10	Y	kind	$\Phi^G_{79} \wedge \Psi \wedge \Phi^L \wedge \Theta$
	10,000.00	-	-	pdr	$\Phi^G_{79} \wedge \Psi$
	662.15	73	Y	pdr	$\Phi^G_{79} \wedge \Psi \wedge \Phi^L \wedge \Theta$

3-agent ring

8-agent ring

Inductive Proof via Strengthening -- Conclusions

- Inductive verification of latency property on a bit-level RTL network from xMAS model
 - Orders of magnitude verification speedup Models complex arbitration behaviors

 - Sound composition
 - X Not automated for cyclic networks

Knowledge of higher-level network structure produces useful invariants for bit-level verification

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Buffer Sizing

- Simulate with symbolic-sized queues
- Assert that a QoS property is violated
- Counterexample reveals valid buffer size

Bryan Brady, Daniel Holcomb, and Sanjit A. Seshia. **Counterexample-Guided SMT-Driven Optimal Buffer Sizing**. In *Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE)*, pp. 329–334, March 2011.

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~holcomb/date11-noc.pdf



Buffer Sizing



• Need to address quantifier alternation $\exists S_i \,\forall P' \in \mathcal{T}. \ (\mathcal{N}[S_i] \| P' \vDash \phi)$

Quantifier Instantiation



Check validity of formula

 $\mathcal{N}[S_i] \| \mathcal{T} \vDash \phi$

- Valid: sizing S_i ensures ϕ
- Invalid: counterexample is traffic pattern P' that causes $\neg\phi$

Check validity of formula

$$|S_i| < size \implies \neg \left(\mathcal{N}[S_i] \| P \vDash \phi\right)$$

- Valid: no S_i ensures ϕ for all P
- Invalid: Counterexample is sizing S_i that ensures ϕ

Buffer Sizing -- Conclusions

Completeness has a cost -- even for network of 3 queues

Verification

- Checking same formula at each iteration i
- More difficult SAT problem at later iterations
 - Few satisfying assignments to be found

	Buffer-Size Verification (BSV)					
	CNF Size		Runtime (sec)			
Iteration i	Vars	Clauses	SAT	Enc	SSim	Total
0	158K	473K	1.4	17.5	1.3	20.2
2	158K	473K	0.9	17.7	1.2	19.9
4	158K	473K	8.9	17.7	1.3	28.0
6	158K	473K	16.8	17.7	1.3	35.8
8	158K	473K	91.7	17.9	1.3	111.0
10	158K	473K	242.8	17.7	1.3	261.8
11	158K	473K	106.0	17.9	1.2	125.3
12*	158K	473K	373.5	16.2	2.7	392.5

Synthesis

- Problem size linear in i
- Binary search to minimize
- Difficulty of SAT problem not necessarily proportional to size
 - Symbolic sim. and decision proc. encoding dominate runtime

	Buffer-Size Synthesis (BSS)						
	CNF Size		Runtime (sec)				
Iteration i	Vars	Clauses	SAT	Enc	SSim	Total	
0	79K	236K	5.6	69.0	11.0	85.7	
2	100K	300K	2.8	60.8	16.0	79.7	
4	217K	650K	5.7	79.7	25.1	110.6	
6	259K	778K	15.0	195.3	60.2	270.6	
8	345K	1037K	27.2	234.5	91.4	353.2	
10	429K	1287K	39.7	342.2	126.7	508.8	
11	486K	1458K	61.0	392.9	155.6	609.6	

Summary

- Formal methods are promising approach for synthesizing and verifying NoC QoS
- Achieved several orders of magnitude speedup over monolithic model checking of latency properties without strengthening
- Not yet a push-button solution for general network models, but xMAS methodology helps

Thank you

Leverage model checking for solving NoC QoS latency problems. Address capacity limitations by extending well-known formal techniques including abstraction and compositional reasoning into the NoC domain

- 3 specific QoS contributions
 - Workload abstraction of traffic models
 - Latency proofs by property strengthening
 - Optimal buffer sizing for QoS

Compositional

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