

Specification Mining:

New Formalisms, Algorithms and Applications

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Dissertation Talk

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Tiny bugs can have
catastrophic consequences

Ubiquitous computing
results in ubiquitous bugs

Formalization of requirement helps
finding bugs, but is hard

Cost of Bugs


- *Human loss*: Pacemakers, Aircraft, Nuclear reactor controllers, Car engine management system, etc.
- *Financial Loss*: 1994 Pentium FDIV costs \$475 million, Mars Rover, North America Blackout, etc.

Much of the challenge in bug finding lies in **finding the specification** that mechanized tools can use to find bugs

Reality Check:


- Writing assertion is a time-consuming manual process and is perceived as “difficult”.
- “During the first formal verification runs of a new hardware design, typically **20%** of the formulas are found to be trivially valid.” [IBM Haifa]

Verification and Synthesis



Specification is arguably the most important step for formal verification and correct-by-construction synthesis


Verification is as *Good* as Specification



Specification:


1. Every request should be eventually granted.
2. Never reach an error state.

Need More Specifications



Verification is as *Bad* as Specification

Missing Assumptions



Specification:

1. Every request should be eventually granted.
2. Never reach an error state.

Need More Specifications



“Not a bug!”

Assertion-based Verification

Poor

Done

No

Yes

Good

Debug

Pass?

Coverage

Temporal specifications can be mined systematically both from observed and counteracting behaviors, and are useful for automating difficult tasks in verification and synthesis such as localizing bugs and finding missing assumptions.

Formalisms


Basis Subtrace Version-Space Learning

Algorithms

Automata-Based Sparse Coding Counterstrategy-Guided

Applications





Bug Localization LTL Synthesis Human-in-the-Loop Controller



Linear Temporal Logic

Formal specification: behavior description supported by logic-based languages

$$\psi ::= p \mid \neg\psi \mid \psi \vee \psi \mid \mathbf{X} \psi \mid \psi \mathbf{U} \psi$$



G ($\text{req} \rightarrow \mathbf{F} \text{grant}$):

Every request must be followed by a grant.


Specification Mining with Templates

Example specification $\psi(a, b)$:

- (1) every a is followed by a b within 3 cycles;
- (2) every two a s are separated by at least 7 cycles.

$$\Sigma = \{a, b\} \quad \Sigma' = \{\text{req}, \text{grant}, \text{reset}\}$$


Find (all) mapping $\rho : \Sigma \rightarrow \Sigma'$, s.t.
 $\psi(\rho(a), \rho(b))$ is true w.r.t. *some evidence*.



Part I

Requirement Generation and Error Localization

Requirement Generation



Static: Infer specification directly from the description of the design, e.g. synthesis of interface specification for Java classes [Alur et. al., 2005]

Dynamic: Infer *likely specification* from simulation /execution traces, e.g. DAIKON [Ernst et. al., 2000]

Automata-based [DAC'10]


Sparse Coding [RV'12]


Specification Mining:

An *Automata-based Monitoring* Approach

Mining Temporal Properties

With a focus on hardware traces





All possible mappings



Challenges:

- Σ' can be very large.
- $\text{Dim}(\text{Table}) \sim |\Sigma|$.

Solutions:

- Design ψ s.t. evaluating transitions are sufficient.
- Small Σ but use inference rules to merge ψ .

$$\psi(\rho(a), \rho(b))$$



Evaluate $\mathcal{A}(\psi)$ over traces

Requirement Generation:

eMIPS - 278 modules and more than 20,000 signals


Design	$ T $	$ T_m^\Delta $	n_m	$ S $	$ S_{\text{merged}} $	Runtime (s)
eMIPS	5 mil	5408	108	2079	1028	51
Router	0.23 mil	12420	28	120	74	13
I2C	1.6 mil	20904	33	389	308	9
CAN	26 mil	36100	175	3272	1356	71

Summary:


- Industrial-size designs;
- Traces of millions of cycles;
- Mine relevant temporal properties efficiently.

Research Question

Can we use the many simple mined specifications to *localize* complex bugs?



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011011010101
010111111010
10101



Post-Si Challenges:


- Limited observability
- Long error detection latency
- Transient and hard-to-reproduce bugs

Where?

Expensive: \$1 million to redesign the masks [Ying et al., 2005];
3:1 headcount for design vs. post-Si validation [Patra et al., 2007]; post-Si validation
consumes 35% of chip development time on average [Abramovici et al., 2006]

Proposed Solution

Mine *distinguishing patterns* between good and bad traces over module interfaces



Error Localization:

CMP router; localize to within 15 cycles for transient faults


Type of Fault	Fault Coverage %	Time Localization %	Module Localization %
Stuck-at	100	-	100
Erroneous Transition	100	-	100
Erroneous Assignment	100	-	57
Transient	100	81	56

Summary:

- eMIPS: effectively localize different design bugs.
- CMP router: effectively localize transient bugs also.
- Mining *simple distinguishing* patterns can help to localize *complex* bugs.


Research Question

Can we learn specifications w/o assuming forms?




Sparse Coding:


Sparsity helps to uncover latent structure
e.g. finding edge detectors in an unsupervised setting



$\approx 0.8 *$



$+ 0.3 *$



$+ 0.5 *$





Specification formalism: Express each subtrace as a Boolean combination of a few “basis subtraces” – a (sparsity-constrained) Boolean matrix factorization problem.

Specification Mining:


A *Sparse Coding* Approach

Problem Formulation



=


basis



columns are sparse

coefficient

○



Multiplication as “AND”
Addition as “OR”

Subtrace

Sparsity-Constrained Boolean Factorization

Given a data matrix $X \in \mathbf{B}^{m \times n}$ and a positive integer C , the *sparsity-constrained Boolean factorization problem* is to find k , $B = \mathbf{B}^{m \times k}$ and $S = \mathbf{B}^{k \times n}$ such that

$$X = B \circ S$$

$$\text{and } \|S_{\cdot,i}\|_1 \leq C, \forall_i$$

(and $\sum_i \sum_j S_{i,j}$ is maximized).


$$\begin{array}{ccc} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} & = & \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \circ \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ X & & B \quad S \end{array} \quad C = 2$$

Algorithm Idea


- Observe that the data matrix X can be viewed as the adjacency matrix for a bipartite graph.
- **Idea:** factorization \rightarrow biclique cover (biclique \leftrightarrow basis subtrace)

$$\begin{matrix} & v \\ u & \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix} \quad (2)$$

(a) Matrix form



(b) Bipartite graph



(c) Biclique edge cover

Error Localization

- Error localization and explanation based on reconstruction:

A subtrace has an error if it cannot be reconstructed from the basis subtraces

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc}
 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \dots & \dots \\
 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & \dots \\
 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \dots & \dots \\
 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & \dots & \dots
 \end{array}$$

$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{X_{\cdot,1}} \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{X_{\cdot,2}}$


$$\text{Minimize } \left\| X_{\cdot,i} \oplus (B \circ S_{\cdot,i}) \right\|_1$$

$S_{\cdot,i}$

$$\text{Subject to } \|S_{\cdot,i}\| \leq C$$

- A subtrace is error-free if

$$\left\| X_{\cdot,i} \oplus (B \circ S_{\cdot,i}) \right\|_1 = 0$$



Experimental Results

- Chip Multiprocessor Router:

- Observe 14 control signals
- Subtrace width: 2 cycles
- Learn the basis from a single error-free trace of 1000 cycles: 0.243 seconds to obtain 189 basis subtraces from 93 distinct subtraces


- Error Localization:

- Inject a single bit flip at a random cycle for each of 99 error traces
- Localize the error to the subtrace (out of 999) where it was injected

- Comparisons:

- Baseline approach (1): hash all distinct subtraces – report error even before an error is injected for the 99 traces
- Baseline approach (2): use unit basis – 0% localization
- **Sparse Coding:** 55.6% localization

A CMP Router
in a NoC



[Source: Daniel Holcomb]


Part I: Contributions

Automata-based: [Li et al., 2010]

- An efficient algorithm for mining *temporal properties* from traces of digital designs.
- Effective algorithm for *localizing bugs* in hardware using *distinguishing patterns*.

Sparse Coding: [Li et al., 2012]

- A novel formalism of specification based on the notion of *basis subtraces*.
- An *unsupervised* algorithm for learning basis subtraces.
- An effective way of using basis subtraces to *localize bugs*.





Part II


Assumption Mining for LTL Synthesis

Temporal Logic Synthesis



Automatically construct an *implementation* that is guaranteed to satisfy its *behavioral description*.




PSL




Digital Circuit




[Bloem et al., 2007]



[Xu, 2013]



[Kress-Gazit, 2008]



[Cheng et al., 2012]

[Wongpiromsarn et al., 2011]

**Main advantage:
Correct-by-construction**

Caveat: Complete specification!

“Writing a complete formal specification for the arbiter was not trivial. Many aspects of the arbiter are not defined in ARM’s standard.” [Bloem et al., 2007]

Assumption Mining:

A *Counterstrategy-Guided* Approach

GR(1) Specifications

$$\psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$$

Require ψ^l for $l \in \{e, s\}$ to be conjunctions in the following forms:

ψ_i^l : a Boolean formula that characterizes the **initial states**.

ψ_t^l : a LTL formula that describes the **transition**, in the form $\mathbf{G} f$, where f is a Boolean combination of variables in $X \cup Y$ and expressions $\mathbf{X} u$ where $u \in X$ if $l = e$ and $u \in X \cup Y$ if $l = s$.

ψ_f^l : a LTL formula that describes **fairness**, in the form $\mathbf{G} \mathbf{F} f$, where f is a Boolean formula over variables in $X \cup Y$.

Advantage: Can find an implementation in $O((2^{|X|+|Y|})^3)$ time.

[Piterman and Pnueli, 2006]

Given $\psi = \psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$ with
input x and output y

$$\psi_f^e = \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{F} (\neg x));$$


$$\psi_t^s = \mathbf{G} ((\neg x) \rightarrow (\neg y));$$

$$\psi_f^s = \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{F} (y));$$

x : 0 1 0 1 0 1 ... Satisfiable
 y : 0 1 0 1 0 1 ...


x : 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... Unrealizable
 y : 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...

Decide if $\exists M$ s.t. $M \models \psi$: Game Solving



A game structure \mathcal{G} is a tuple $(X, Y, Q, \theta, \rho^e, \rho^s, Win)$, where

- X : a set of **input** variables controlled by e .
- Y : a set of **output** variables controlled by s .
- $Q \subseteq 2^X \times 2^Y$: **state space**.
- θ : a Boolean formula over $X \cup Y$ that defines the **initial states**.
- $\rho^e \subseteq Q \times 2^X$: **environment transition relation**.
- $\rho^s \subseteq Q \times 2^X \times 2^Y$: **system transition relation**.
- Win : **winning condition** of the game.



Given GR(1) specifications $\psi_i^e, \psi_i^s, \psi_t^e, \psi_t^s, \psi_f^e, \psi_f^s$,

- $\theta = \psi_i^e \wedge \psi_i^s$
- $\rho^e = \psi_t^e$ replacing $(\mathbf{X} u)$ by u'
- $\rho^s = \psi_t^s$ replacing $(\mathbf{X} u)$ by u'
- *Win* is given by $\psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$

$$\bigwedge_i \psi_{f,i}^e \rightarrow \bigwedge_j \psi_{f,j}^s$$

Remark: The mapping also works for specifications given as deterministic Büchi automata.

GR(1) Synthesis ~ Games

Compute winning regions $W^s \subseteq Q$ using a nested fixpoint formula.

[Piterman and Pnueli, 2006]

$W^s \xrightarrow{\text{extract}}$ strategy $\mathcal{S}^s = (\Gamma^s, \gamma_0^s, \eta^s) \xrightarrow{\text{compute}}$ circuit consistent with \mathcal{S}^s
(if $Q_0 \subseteq W^s$)

Dually, compute winning regions $W^e = Q \setminus W^s$ using fixpoint formula.

$W^e \xrightarrow{\text{extract}}$ counterstrategy $\mathcal{S}^e = (\Gamma^e, \gamma_0^e, \eta^e)$ [Könighofer et al., 2009]

Problem: ψ not realizable if $Q_0 \cap W^e \neq \emptyset$

$$\mathcal{S}^e \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \Gamma^e = \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \\ \gamma_0^e \in \Gamma^e \\ \eta^e \subseteq Q \times \Gamma \times 2^X \times \Gamma \end{array} \right.$$

Key idea: Mine additional assumption ϕ to prohibit \mathcal{S}^e


Given $\psi = \psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$ with
input x and output y

$$\psi_f^e = \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{F} (\neg x));$$

$$\psi_t^s = \mathbf{G} ((\neg x) \rightarrow (\neg y));$$

$$\psi_f^s = \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{F} (y));$$

Unrealizable



$$\text{Counterstrategy} \models \mathbf{F} (\mathbf{G} (\neg x))$$

Candidate assumption:

$$\phi = \neg(\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{G} (\neg x))) = \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{F} (x))$$

$$\Rightarrow \psi_{new} = \phi \wedge \psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$$

Realizable

A **counterstrategy graph** G^c is a discrete transition system $(V, V_0 \subseteq V, T \subseteq V \times V)$, where

- $V \subseteq Q \times \Gamma^e$: *state space*,
- $V_0 = Q_0 \times \gamma_0^e$: *initial states*
- $T = \eta^e \wedge \rho^s$: *transition relation*

G^c contains all game states where env. e adheres to $\mathcal{S}^e = (\Gamma^e, \gamma_0^e, \eta^e)$

General Solution:

Given a candidate assumption ϕ and a counterstrategy graph G^c ,
 $\psi_{new}^e := \phi \wedge \psi^e$ if $\phi \wedge \psi^e \neq \text{false}$ and $G^c \models \neg\phi$ (*model checking*).

(a) **Consistency**: $\phi \wedge \psi^e \neq \text{false}$

(b) Done if $\psi_{new}^e \rightarrow \psi^s$ is **realizable**;

(c) Otherwise, iterate with new candidate ϕ_{new} and new G_{new}^c .

Question: How to pick ϕ ?

Mining with Templates

What kind of assumptions?

- **Efficient:** In GR(1) to take advantage of $O(|Q|^3)$ algorithm.
- **User-friendly:** Simple formulas are easier to understand.
- **Representative:** Cover ϕ_i, ϕ_t, ϕ_f .

Assumption Templates:

- ϕ_a : $\mathbf{G F} u$ or $\mathbf{G F} (u \vee v)$ where u and v are literals over X .
- ϕ_b : $\mathbf{G} u$ or $\mathbf{G} (u \vee v)$, where u and v are literals over X .
- ϕ_c : $\mathbf{G} (u \rightarrow (\mathbf{X} v))$, where u and v are literals over X .

Related: Assumptions for LTL synthesis as a monolithic Büchi automaton. [Chatterjee et al., 2008]


Iterative Search

Problem1: Redundant Checks


Problem2: Restricted by Templates

Idea:

- Check one type of assumption in GR(1) at a time.
- Use a random determinization of G^c .



Search Optimizations



Boolean formula u over X and v over $X \cup Y$

Compute ϕ_1, ϕ_2, ϕ_3 given *symbolic* representation of the counterstrategy graph $G^c = (V, V_0, T)$.

Lemma1: $\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$ is a minimal assumption in GR(1) syntax that removes the counterstrategy.

Lemma2: The optimized algorithm produces a *nontrivial* ϕ , i.e. $\phi \wedge \psi^e \neq \text{false}$.

Theorem: Given a *satisfiable* GR(1) specification $\psi = \psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$ and a G^c that represents *all* moves by the environment to force a violation of ψ , the optimized algorithm computes a *nontrivial* and *minimal* environment assumption ϕ in GR(1) such that $\phi \wedge \psi^e \rightarrow \psi^s$ is *realizable*.

Experimental Evaluation

Benchmarks:

- IBM Gen. Buffer, AMBA AHB Bus. [Bloem et al., 2007]
- Simple robotic controller.

Setup:

- Remove a single assumption from a realizable specification.
- Mine ϕ s.t. ψ is realizable.

Result Highlight:

- Recover the missing assumption in most cases.
- Reasonable replacement?

AMBA AHB Example:


HLOCK[0]: locked access
HBUSREQ[0]: bus request

$$\phi_{\text{original}} = \mathbf{G} (\text{HLOCK}[0] \rightarrow \text{HBUSREQ}[0])$$

$$\phi_{\text{mined}} = \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{F} \neg \text{HBUSREQ}[0])$$

Summary of Contributions

- First **counterstrategy-guided synthesis** framework



- An efficient algorithm with theoretical guarantees for assumption generation – a key problem in correct-by-construction synthesis from temporal logic.

Assumption Mining:

Synthesizing *Human-in-the-Loop* Controllers

Many *safety-critical* systems interact with humans. The correctness of such systems depend on both the correctness of **autonomous controller**, **actions of the human** and **their interaction**.



“Vehicles at this level of automation enable the driver to cede full control of all safety-critical functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions and in those conditions to rely heavily on the vehicle to **monitor for changes** in those conditions requiring **transition back to driver** control. The driver is expected to be available for **occasional control**, but with **sufficiently comfortable transition time.**”

Level 0: **No Automation**: Driver is in complete control

Level 1: **Function Specific Automation** *Pre-charged Brakes*

Level 2: **Combined Function Automation** *Cruise Control
Lane Keeping*

Level 3: **Limited Self Driving Automation**

Level 4: **Full Self Driving Automation**



Source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Preliminary statement of policy concerning automated vehicles, May 2013.


Research Question

When autonomous controller fails,
can human safely take over control?



MIT Cornell Crash during DARPA Urban Challenge, 2007

Human-in-the-Loop Controllers




Criteria:

- **Monitoring**
Determine control switch based on monitored information
- **Minimally Intervening**
Low probability of human control needed
- **Prescient**
Notify danger ahead of time
- **Conditionally Correct**
Safe until human takes over control

Composition of Auto-Controller, Human Operator and **Advisory Controller**

Controller Synthesis



↳ Advisory Controller

Approach:

- Mine *transition* assumptions ϕ_3 to monitor
- Modify G^c to account for human response time
- Assign probability and early intervention penalty to G^c
- Find *s-t cut* in the weighted G^c

Theoretical Guarantees

Theorem: Given a GR(1) specification ψ , and a response time parameter T , the algorithm is guaranteed to either produce a fully autonomous controller satisfying ψ , or a HuIL controller, modeled as a composition of an auto-controller, a human operator and an advisory controller that is **monitoring**, **prescient** (with parameter T), **minimally intervening** and **conditionally correct**.

Assumptions: System cannot fail within T steps.

Remark: The human operator can be replaced by a controller that maintains critical functionalities.

A Car Following Example


Autonomous car: A

Environment cars: B & C


Objective: A follows B, and when this is not achievable, *switches control* to the human driver with *sufficient time* for her to respond.

Follow := move to a square where A can still sense B

Given specs encoding movement rules and $T = 1$.




Sensing Regions:




Assume given a finite-state abstraction.

[Kloetzer and Belta, 2008] [Bhatia, 2011] [Wolff et al., 2013]

Failure Scenario:



Step 1



Step 2

A Car Following Example

Mined Assumptions:

$$\varphi_{env} = \mathbf{G} (((p_A = 4) \wedge (p_B = 6) \wedge (p_c = 1)) \rightarrow$$


$$\mathbf{X} ((p_B \neq 8) \wedge (p_C \neq 5))) \wedge$$

$$\mathbf{G} (((p_A = 4) \wedge (p_B = 6) \wedge (p_c = 1)) \rightarrow$$

$$\mathbf{X} ((p_B \neq 6) \wedge (p_C \neq 3))) \wedge$$

$$\mathbf{G} (((p_A = 4) \wedge (p_B = 6) \wedge (p_c = 1)) \rightarrow$$

$$\mathbf{X} ((p_B \neq 6) \wedge (p_C \neq 5))) \wedge$$




Part 2: Contributions

Assumption Mining: [Li et al., 2011]

- First *counterstrategy-guided* approach for synthesis from temporal logic.
- An efficient algorithm with theoretical guarantees for *mining assumptions* for GR(1) synthesis.

Human-in-the-Loop Controllers: [Li et al., 2013]

- A novel formalism of *human-in-the-loop controllers*.
- Identify criteria with application to *driving automation*.
- An algorithm for *synthesizing* human-in-the-loop controllers that automatically satisfy these criteria, from temporal logic specifications.




Human Inputs:

CrowdMine: Gamification and Crowdsourcing

CrowdMine

Web-based Game Prototype

Traces



Two Sampled Subtraces



Counterexample




Selected Patterns \rightarrow LTL Formulas \rightarrow Model Checker



[URL: <http://verifun.eecs.berkeley.edu/crowdmine2/>]

Preliminary Results

- Circuit: I/O traces from a 2-input 2-output arbiter.



- Top ranked patterns:



“When r_1 is high and there is no competing r_0 , g_1 is high at the same cycle.”

Discussion

Remark: w/o model checker in the loop.

- What are humans good at?
 - **Visual recognition?**

Most frequently identified common patterns correspond to desired behaviors of the circuit.
 - **Randomness?**

165 different patterns out of 283 hits (mostly EECS students)
Top rank patterns have counts 31, 16 and 7.
- What problems do we crowdsource?

Problems that require human input and insight, or ones that are hard to formally define.


 - E.g. specification, diagnosis, repair.
 - *Not* purely computationally intractable problems.

Related Work: FunSAT/Human EDA [DeOrio and Bertacco, DAC 2009]

Human Inputs:

Mapping *Natural Language* to Temporal Logic

Natural Language → LTL Specification



Result highlights:

- FAA-Isolette requirements from NL to LTL.
- Assumption mining discovered a missing assumption.

Source: D. L. Lempia and S. P. Miller. Requirements engineering management handbook. Final Report DOT/FAA/AR-08/32, Federal Aviation Administration, June 2009.

Conclusion

Formal specifications can be mined in a systematic way to improve the effectiveness of verification and synthesis.

Formalisms

Basis Subtrace
Version-Space Learning

Algorithms

Automata-Based
Sparse Coding
Counterstrategy-Guided

Applications

Bug Localization
LTL Synthesis
Human-in-the-Loop Controller

Future Work

- Combine automata-based and sparse coding-based approaches for mining specifications.
- Improve the scalability of the sparse coding-based approach.
- Mining assumptions in contract-based synthesis.
- Evaluate human-in-the-loop controller synthesis in real setting.
- Human studies of CrowdMine for large designs.
- More robust NL→LTL techniques.

Thank you!