Citation
Siddharth Garg. "Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape and Possible Solutions". Talk or presentation, 10, November, 2015.

Abstract
For economic reasons, the design and fabrication of semiconductor ICs is increasingly outsourced. This comes at the expense of trust. An untrusted entity, for instance a malicious designer or semiconductor foundry could pirate the design, or worse, maliciously modify it to leak secret information from the chip or sabotage its functionality. In this talk, I will present my recent work on two defense mechanisms to secure computer hardware against such attacks. The first is split manufacturing, which enables a designer to partition a design across multiple chips, fabricate each separately, and "glue" them together after fabrication. Since each foundry only sees a part of the design, its ability to infer the design intent is hindered. I will propose a quantitative notion of security for split manufacturing and explore the resulting cost-security trade-offs. In the second part of the talk, I will discuss another defense mechanism: logic obfuscation. Previous work has proposed logic obfuscation with seemingly strong security guarantees. I will present a new and effective attack on all existing logic obfuscation techniques, and the security implications of this new attack.

Electronic downloads

• seminar.2015-11-10.Siddharth_Garg.pptx · application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.pre · 3912 kbytes

• HTML

  Siddharth Garg. <a
  href="http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/1155.html"
  ><i>Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape
  and Possible Solutions</i></a>, Talk or
  presentation,  10, November, 2015.

• Plain text

  Siddharth Garg. "Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat
  Landscape and Possible Solutions". Talk or
  presentation,  10, November, 2015.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Garg15_HardwareSecurityEmergingThreatLandscapePossibleSolutions,
      author = {Siddharth Garg},
      title = {Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape
                and Possible Solutions},
      day = {10},
      month = {November},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {For economic reasons, the design and fabrication
                of semiconductor ICs is increasingly outsourced.
                This comes at the expense of trust. An untrusted
                entity, for instance a malicious designer or
                semiconductor foundry could pirate the design, or
                worse, maliciously modify it to leak secret
                information from the chip or sabotage its
                functionality. In this talk, I will present my
                recent work on two defense mechanisms to secure
                computer hardware against such attacks. The first
                is split manufacturing, which enables a designer
                to partition a design across multiple chips,
                fabricate each separately, and "glue" them
                together after fabrication. Since each foundry
                only sees a part of the design, its ability to
                infer the design intent is hindered. I will
                propose a quantitative notion of security for
                split manufacturing and explore the resulting
                cost-security trade-offs. In the second part of
                the talk, I will discuss another defense
                mechanism: logic obfuscation. Previous work has
                proposed logic obfuscation with seemingly strong
                security guarantees. I will present a new and
                effective attack on all existing logic obfuscation
                techniques, and the security implications of this
                new attack.},
      URL = {http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/1155.html}
  }
  

Posted by Sadigh Dorsa on 16 Nov 2015.
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