Citation
Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John Chuang. "Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent Network Security". 3rd International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin, Germany, June, 2010.

Abstract
By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security of the overall system. We study two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and costsubsidies (pay for effort).

Electronic downloads

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1774088.1774486

• HTML

  Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John
  Chuang. <a
  href="http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/771.html"
  >Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent Network
  Security</a>, 3rd International Conference on Trust
  and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin, Germany,
  June, 2010.

• Plain text

  Jens Grossklags, Svetlana Radosavac, Alvaro Cardenas, John
  Chuang. "Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent
  Network Security". 3rd International Conference on
  Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin,
  Germany, June, 2010.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{GrossklagsRadosavacCardenasChuang10_NudgeIntermediariesRoleInInterdependentNetworkSecurity,
      author = {Jens Grossklags and Svetlana Radosavac and Alvaro
                Cardenas and John Chuang},
      title = {Nudge: Intermediaries Role in Interdependent
                Network Security},
      booktitle = {3rd International Conference on Trust and
                Trustworthy Computing (TRUST 2010), Berlin, Germany},
      month = {June},
      year = {2010},
      abstract = {By employing an interdependent security
                game-theoretic framework, we study how individual
                Internet Service Providers can coordinate the
                investment decisions of end users to improve the
                security of the overall system. We study two
                different forms of intervention: rebates in
                combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and
                costsubsidies (pay for effort).},
      URL = {http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/pubs/771.html}
  }
  

Posted by Christopher Brooks on 10 Nov 2010.
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