

Deploying formal in a simulation world


VIGYAN SINGHAL
OSKI TECHNOLOGY



Formal from different vantage points

**University Researcher
(4 yrs 1991-1995)
(UC Berkeley)**

**Goal: advance state-
of-the-art**



**Semiconductor tool user
(6 yrs 2005-2011)
(Oski)**

**Goal: optimize \$ and
time-to-market**



**EDA tool developer
(10 yrs 1995-2005)
(Cadence, Jasper)**

**Goal: build
competitive tools**

- Goal: advance state-of-the-art
- Areas of concern
 - Temporal logics (CTL, CTL*, PLTL)
 - Fairness and ω -automata
 - Complexity
 - Known: CTL Model checking linear time complexity (size of FSM)
 - Proved: CTL model checking PSPACE-complete (size of design)
- Time to returns: almost infinite
- Anecdote: “model check a 9-state FSM at Motorola”

Formal in EDA company



- Goal: build competitive tools
- Areas of concern
 - Verilog/SystemVerilog parsing
 - User interface and GUI
 - Property synthesis: PSL and SVA
- Time to returns: 4-5 years
- Anecdote: “lost an eval at Intel because tool ran for 28 days”

Formal in semiconductor industry




- Goal: optimize \$ and time-to-market
- Areas of concern
 - Verification planning
 - Metrics to measure progress, and when we are done
 - Integrate simulation and formal planning and results
 - Abstraction (and reductions) are key to making formal productive
- Time to returns: 3-6 months
- Anecdote: “how did you miss a bug on a formally verified block?”

Types of post-silicon flaws



Verification is still the largest problem




Wilson Research Group and Mentor Graphics
2010 Functional Verification Study. Used with permission.

Verification market size (2009)*



* excluding analog




Source:
Gary Smith EDA,
October 2010


- **Gate-level formal (equivalence checking)**
 - Then (1993): Chrysalis; Now: Cadence (Verplex), Synopsys
- **RTL formal (model checking)**
 - Then (1994): Averant, IBM; Now: Jasper, Mentor (0-In)

Formal tool usage in industry

- Around for 20 years
- Expectations has been set high
 - Low efforts for constraints
 - Tools run fast enough
- Expectations have been set low
 - Only verify local assertions
 - No End-to-End proofs
- Perception: low !/\$
- Training and staffing
 - Few places to learn formal application
 - Single user should not do both formal and simulation




Tradeoffs in design flow



Biggest challenges needing solutions




- Verification management and coverage




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Achieving verification closure



“Control”, “Data Transport” designs

- Arbiters of many kinds
- Interrupt controller
- Power management unit
- Credit manager block
- Tag generator
- Schedulers
- Bus bridge
- Memory Controller
- DMA controller
- Host bus interface
- Standard interfaces (PCI Express, USB)
- Clock disable unit




Multiple, concurrent streams
Hard to completely verify using simulation

“10 bugs per 1000 gates”
-Ted Scardamalia, IBM

“Data transform” designs


- Floating point unit
- Graphics shading unit
- Inverse quantization
- Convolution unit in a DSP chip
- MPEG decoder
- Classification search algorithm
- Instruction decode



Single, sequential functional streams
“2 bugs per 1000 gates”
-Ted Scardamalia, IBM

Formal (MC, SEC*) and simulation strengths

* SEC = Sequential Equivalence Checking (RTL vs C model)




How perfect does formal have to be?



Graphic: MacGregor
Marketing


- Not all bugs need to be found/fixed
- Formal does not need to find the last bug
- Usually bounded proofs are good enough
(if bound is good enough!)
- Formal has to be more cost-effective than the alternative

Bug-fix cost rises exponentially





Verification manager's dashboard


Coverage tracking




Bug tracking




Runtime status



A simulation testbench



A formal testbench



Three Cs of Formal




- Checkers
- Constraints
- Complexity
 - (using Abstraction Models)

- ... and Coverage (to measure completeness of formal)


Traditional formal verification

- Usually based on Local Checkers:
 1. RTL assertions
 2. Interface assertions
- Useful for bug hunting
 - Not for finding all/most bugs, or as replacement for simulation effort
- For replacing simulation, need End-to-End Checkers
- Run into complexity barrier
 - For medium- or large-sized designs, run into state space explosion
 - Without Abstraction Models, cannot scale complexity



Checkers (End-to-End)

- For End-to-End formal verification, less than 5% of Checker code is SVA; rest is SV or Verilog
 - (Synthesizable) Reference model is typically as big an effort as the RTL





Source of Complexity

```
input a;  
reg b;  
reg [1:0] st;  
  
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
if (~rst) st <= 2'b00;  
else case( st )  
  2'b00: if (~a) st <= 2'b01;  
  2'b01: st <= 2'b10;  
  2'b10: if (a) st <= 2'b00;  
endcase  
  
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
if (~rst) b <= 1'b0;  
else if (~a | b) b <= 1'b0;  
else b <= 1'b1;
```

RTL

Checker: (st == 2'b01) => ~b

Internal Netlist




Internal STG


$2^3 = 8$
$2^{10} = 1,024$
$2^{20} = 1,048,576$
$2^{30} = 1,073,741,824$

Complexity – function of Cone-of-Influence

- One coarse measure of Complexity
 - number of flops/memory bits in the Cone-of-Influence of the Checker



State space complexity




Abstractions (to manage complexity)




- An “Abstraction” of a design is a design that has a superset of the design behavior
- Useful to overcome complexity barriers
 - Smaller Cone-of-Influence
 - Shallower search space
 - Ability to skip long initialization sequences
- Cannot give a false positive
- Can give a false negative (Fail), but...
 - You get a trace to determine the reason for the negative

Complexity (and Abstractions)

- Effect of abstractions:
 - Reduces state space
 - Adds state transitions
 - Adds Reset states




Overcoming complexity with Abstractions



Examples of Abstractions


- Allow DUT to reset to a deep state
 - BANKS_IDLE state for a memory controllers (skips thousands of clocks of initialization)
- Replace memory by a memory model tracking a specific Byte of a specific Beat of a specific Transaction
 - 13th transaction, 243rd beat, 1st Byte
- Replace a Tag Generator by an abstract model
 - Reduce sequential depth by tracking specific value
 - Example in the next few slides...

Example: PCIe Transaction Layer




- 128-bit datapath
- 8 VCs
- History, policy-dependent DRR scheduler
- Conf responses arbitrated with TLPs and FC DLLPs
- Tx, Rx Buffers can store multiple TLPs (upto 32kb each)

Abstraction for Tag Allocator



- Pick an arbitrary, but fixed tag: e.g. tag #79
- Replace Tag Allocator by a two-state Abstraction:
 - HAS_79 (H): models that Tag_Allocator has tag #79
 - DOESNOT_HAVE_79 (D): Tag Allocator does not have #79

Abstraction for Tag Allocator



A. Use Tag Allocator Abstraction (DUT = Design with abstracted TA)

- Add constraints
 1. $(\text{state} == \text{H}) \ |-> \ (\text{!empty});$
 2. $(\text{state} == \text{D}) \ |-> \ (\text{tag_out} \ != \ 79);$
- Add assertions:
 1. $(\text{state} == \text{H}) \ |-> \ (\text{tag_return} \ != \ 79);$
 2. $(\text{state} == \text{D}) \ |-> \ \text{Tag \#79 is eventually returned}$

B. Prove Tag Allocator Abstraction (DUT = Tag Allocator RTL)

- Reverse constraints and assertions (e.g. prove no tags leak)
- Can be a sequentially long, but on a tiny DUT

- Other example of Abstraction Models:
 - Localization
 - Datapath
 - Memory
 - Sequence
 - Counter
 - Floating pulse
- Without Abstraction Models:
 - On most interesting designs, formal tools do not search far enough

*Verification closure with formal
and simulation*

OSKI TECHNOLOGY, INC.

Unique Methodology. Highest Coverage. Fastest Time to Market.



Coverage on RTL designs


RTL (Verilog)

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = d;  
5.   else  
6.     p = e;  
7. end
```

Equivalent RTL

```
1. reg w, p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   w = a || (b && c);  
4. end  
5. always @ (*) begin  
6.   p = (w && d) || ((!w) && e);  
7. end
```

Synthesis



Input Coverage: line/expression coverage



```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = d;  
5.   else  
6.     p = e;  
7. end
```

Line coverage

a	b	c	p
0	0	0	e
0	0	1	e
0	1	0	e
0	1	1	d
1	0	0	d
1	0	1	d
1	1	0	d
1	1	1	d

target #1

target #2

Expression coverage

a	b	c	p
0	0	0	e
0	0	1	e
0	1	0	e
0	1	1	d
1	0	0	d
1	0	1	d
1	1	0	d
1	1	1	d

#1

#2

#3


#4

STG coverage vs code coverage

```
input a;  
reg b;  
reg [1:0] st;
```


```
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
if (~rst) st <= 2'b00;  
else case( st )  
  2'b00: if (~a) st <= 2'b01;  
  2'b01: st <= 2'b10;  
  2'b10: if (a) st <= 2'b00;  
endcase
```

```
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
if (~rst) b <= 1'b0;  
else if (~a | b) b <= 1'b0;  
else b <= 1'b1;
```




Simulation coverage (a = 0)

```
input a;  
reg b;  
reg [1:0] st;  
  
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
  if (~rst) st <= 2'b00;  
  else case( st )  
    2'b00: if (~a) st <= 2'b01;  
    2'b01: st <= 2'b10;  
    2'b10: if (a) st <= 2'b00;  
  endcase  
  
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
  if (~rst) b <= 1'b0;  
  else if (~a | b) b <= 1'b0;  
  else b <= 1'b1;
```



Coverage-driven simulation methodology



Coverage for hardware designs




- Trivial to get to 60-70% code coverage
- 100% line/expression coverage often required for tapeouts
 - Manual waivers are allowed
- NVIDIA SNUG 2011 paper
 - 270 man weeks to do waiver analysis for one design
 - 180 man weeks to write missing tests


Coverage closure phases




Functional coverage targets



Coverage database collection



Coverage database collection





“The perfect is the enemy of good”

-Voltaire (1772)

- Coverage is not perfect
 - Bugs are missed even with 100% coverage
- But...
 - Helps measure progress
 - Helps identify blind-spots


Input vs Observable coverage

- “Have I verified enough input sequences” (Input coverage)
- “Is my set of checkers complete enough” (Observable coverage)
- Same two notions apply for both simulation AND formal
 - Bounded model checking (BMC) is the most used formal technique

NOTE

Formal does not verify all possible input sequences

Coverage reporting



Coverage Summary Report, Instance-Based

[Top Level Summary](#)


[Legend and Help](#)

Instance name: mic
Module/Entity name: mic

Total	Block	Expression	Toggle	FSM	Assertion	Name
82%	95% (172/180)	100% (3/3)	96% (2929/3056)	100% (24/24)	20% (1/5)	Cumulative
97%	No Items	No Items	97% (412/424)	No Items	No Items	Self

Coverage of immediate sub-instances:

Total	Block	Expression	Toggle	FSM	Assertion	Name
98%	100% (73/73)	No Items	96% (2032/2121)	No Items	No Items	mic_fifo_0
58%	91% (29/32)	No Items	82% (52/63)	No Items	0% (0/2)	mic_arb_0
75%	96% (50/52)	100% (3/3)	79% (19/24)	100% (24/24)	0% (0/2)	fifo_state_0
85%	70% (7/10)	No Items	100% (264/264)	No Items	No Items	mux8_0
97%	100% (8/8)	No Items	92% (100/109)	No Items	100% (1/1)	memctl_0
99%	100% (5/5)	No Items	98% (50/51)	No Items	No Items	sram_0



Coverage reporting



The screenshot displays the InCision Metrics Center interface for a project named 'merge_top'. The top status bar shows the following coverage metrics:

- Local Overall Grade: 94.95%
- Local Code Grade: 97.44%
- Local Block Grade: 92.31%
- Local Expression Grade: 100%

The 'BLOCKS' table lists the following data:

Index	Block Type	Line	Score
1	code block	3	2
2	true part of	10	2
3	false part of	14	2
4	a case item of	16	2
5	true part of	18	2
6	false part of	19	2
7	true part of	20	2
8	a case item of	22	2
9	true part of	24	1
10	false part of	25	2
11	true part of	26	1
12	a case item of	26	1
13	true part of	30	0

The 'SOURCE OF: Block1' window shows the following Verilog code snippet:


```
7 always @(posedge clk or negedge rst_)
8 begin
9   if (~rst_)
10  begin
11    sn <= RED;
12  end
13  else
14  begin
15    case(sn)
16    RED: begin
17      if (a)
18        sn <= GREEN;
19      else if (b)
20        sn <= YELLOW;
21    end
22    GREEN: begin
23      if (a)
24        sn <= RED;
25      else if (b)
26        sn <= YELLOW;
27    end
28    YELLOW: begin
29      if (a)
30        sn <= RED;
31    end
```

Is my formal complete?

- Are my Checkers complete?
- Are my Constraints complete?
- Is my Complexity strategy complete?


Formal coverage (depth = 1)

```
input a;  
reg b;  
reg [1:0] st;  
  
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
  if (~rst) st <= 2'b00;  
  else case( st )  
    2'b00: if (~a) st <= 2'b01;  
    2'b01: st <= 2'b10;  
    2'b10: if (a) st <= 2'b00;  
  endcase  
  
always @(posedge clk or negedge rst)  
  if (~rst) b <= 1'b0;  
  else if (~a | b) b <= 1'b0;  
  else b <= 1'b1;
```




- Constraints: Environment may be over-constrained
 - Intentional: avoided some hard to model or verify input combinations
 - Unintentional: bugs in constraints; forgot to remove intentional over-constraints
- Complexity: All checkers are verified up to proof depth N
 - Any target, not reachable in N clocks, is not covered
- Checkers: does not verify completeness of Checkers
 - No different than simulation!


Coverage database collection



Formal coverage integrated with simulation



Formal code coverage methodology



Observable Coverage (using mutations)

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = d;  
5.   else  
6.     p = e;  
7. end
```

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = 1'bX;  
5.   else  
6.     p = e;  
7. end
```

Mutant for line#4

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = d;  
5.   else  
6.     p = 1'bX;  
7. end
```

Mutant for line#6

Observable Coverage for formal

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = d;  
5.   else  
6.     p = e;  
7. end
```

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = <primary_input>;  
5.   else  
6.     p = e;  
7. end
```

Mutant for line#4

```
1. reg p;  
2. always @(*) begin  
3.   if (a || (b && c))  
4.     p = d;  
5.   else  
6.     p = <primary_input>;  
7. end
```

Mutant for line#6

- Formal Coverage must fit with Simulation Coverage
 - Same metrics, same meaning
- Formal verification in practice:
 - BMC is the primary workhorse of practical formal verification
 - Checkers are complex Verilog, simple SVA
 - Abstraction Models are key to increasing formal coverage

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