Resilient Supervisory Control of Autonomous Intersections in the Presence of Sensor Attacks
Amin Ghafouri

Citation
Amin Ghafouri. "Resilient Supervisory Control of Autonomous Intersections in the Presence of Sensor Attacks". Talk or presentation, 4, November, 2015.

Abstract
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are vulnerable to external cyber-attacks and their safety-critical nature makes them a target for malicious adversaries. We study the problem of supervisory control of autonomous intersections in the presence of sensor attacks. Sensor attacks are performed when an adversary gains access to the transmission channel and corrupts the measurements before they are received by the decision making unit. We show that supervisory control system is vulnerable to attacks on sensor data. We introduce a detector in the control architecture and focus on stealthy attacks that cannot be detected but are capable of compromising safety. We then present a resilient supervisory control system (RSCS) that is secure against such attacks.

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Citation formats

• HTML

  Amin Ghafouri. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/100.html"
  ><i>Resilient Supervisory Control of Autonomous
  Intersections in the Presence of Sensor
  Attacks</i></a>, Talk or presentation,  4,
  November, 2015.

• Plain text

  Amin Ghafouri. "Resilient Supervisory Control of
  Autonomous Intersections in the Presence of Sensor
  Attacks". Talk or presentation,  4, November, 2015.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Ghafouri15_ResilientSupervisoryControlOfAutonomousIntersections,
      author = {Amin Ghafouri},
      title = {Resilient Supervisory Control of Autonomous
                Intersections in the Presence of Sensor Attacks},
      day = {4},
      month = {November},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are vulnerable to
                external cyber-attacks and their safety-critical
                nature makes them a target for malicious
                adversaries. We study the problem of supervisory
                control of autonomous intersections in the
                presence of sensor attacks. Sensor attacks are
                performed when an adversary gains access to the
                transmission channel and corrupts the measurements
                before they are received by the decision making
                unit. We show that supervisory control system is
                vulnerable to attacks on sensor data. We introduce
                a detector in the control architecture and focus
                on stealthy attacks that cannot be detected but
                are capable of compromising safety. We then
                present a resilient supervisory control system
                (RSCS) that is secure against such attacks.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/100.html}
  }
  

Posted by Carolyn Winter on 4 Nov 2015.
Groups: forces
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