Attack-Resilient Traffic-Signal Configurations
Aron Laszka

Citation
Aron Laszka. "Attack-Resilient Traffic-Signal Configurations". Talk or presentation, 4, November, 2015.

Abstract
Traffic signals were originally standalone hardware devices running on fixed schedules, but by now, they have evolved into complex networked systems. While traditional hardware systems were susceptible only to attacks based on direct physical access, systems nowadays may be vulnerable to attacks through wireless interfaces, or even to remote attacks through the Internet. Due to hardware-based failsafes, these vulnerabilities cannot be used to cause accidents; however, they might be used to cause disastrous traffic congestions. Since eliminating all vulnerabilities from these systems is practically impossible, we must mitigate attacks through attack-resilient design. In order to be able to design transportation networks and traffic-signal configurations that are resilient to attacks, we first need to be able to determine how resilient a given configuration is. We show that this problem is computationally hard, and propose heuristic algorithms for finding worst-case attacks, which can be used to evaluate resilience and identify critical intersections. Using numerical results, we compare these heuristic algorithms to exhaustive search in terms of solution quality and running time. Finally, we present simulation-based results on an actual transportation network.

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Citation formats

• HTML

  Aron Laszka. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/102.html"
  ><i>Attack-Resilient Traffic-Signal
  Configurations</i></a>, Talk or presentation, 
  4, November, 2015.

• Plain text

  Aron Laszka. "Attack-Resilient Traffic-Signal
  Configurations". Talk or presentation,  4, November,
  2015.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Laszka15_AttackResilientTrafficSignalConfigurations,
      author = {Aron Laszka},
      title = {Attack-Resilient Traffic-Signal Configurations},
      day = {4},
      month = {November},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {Traffic signals were originally standalone
                hardware devices running on fixed schedules, but
                by now, they have evolved into complex networked
                systems. While traditional hardware systems were
                susceptible only to attacks based on direct
                physical access, systems nowadays may be
                vulnerable to attacks through wireless interfaces,
                or even to remote attacks through the Internet.
                Due to hardware-based failsafes, these
                vulnerabilities cannot be used to cause accidents;
                however, they might be used to cause disastrous
                traffic congestions. Since eliminating all
                vulnerabilities from these systems is practically
                impossible, we must mitigate attacks through
                attack-resilient design. In order to be able to
                design transportation networks and traffic-signal
                configurations that are resilient to attacks, we
                first need to be able to determine how resilient a
                given configuration is. We show that this problem
                is computationally hard, and propose heuristic
                algorithms for finding worst-case attacks, which
                can be used to evaluate resilience and identify
                critical intersections. Using numerical results,
                we compare these heuristic algorithms to
                exhaustive search in terms of solution quality and
                running time. Finally, we present simulation-based
                results on an actual transportation network.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/102.html}
  }
  

Posted by Carolyn Winter on 4 Nov 2015.
Groups: forces
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