Citation
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. "Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity Distribution Networks to DER Disruptions". 2015 American Control Conference, 2461-2468, 2015.

Abstract
We formulate a sequential (Stackelberg) game for assessing the vulnerability of radial electricity distribution networks to disruptions in Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). In this model, the attacker disrupts a subset of DER nodes by remotely manipulating the set-points of their inverters. The defender (network operator) responds by controlling the noncompromised DERs and by imposing partial load reduction via direct load control. The attacker’s (resp. defender’s) objective is to maximize (resp. minimize) the weighted sum of cost due to the loss of voltage regulation and the cost of load control. For the sequential play game where the attacker (resp. defender) is the leader (resp. follower) and under linear power flow equations, we show that the problem reduces to standard bilevel network interdiction problem. Under our assumptions on the attack model, we obtain a structural insight that the attacker’s optimal strategy is to compromise the downstream DER nodes as opposed to the upstream ones. We present a small case study to demonstrate the applicability of our model for vulnerability assessment of distribution networks.

Electronic downloads

• Shela_Amin_ACC.pdf · application/pdf · 478 kbytes

• HTML

  Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/133.html"
  >Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity Distribution
  Networks to DER Disruptions</a>, 2015 American Control
  Conference, 2461-2468, 2015.

• Plain text

  Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. "Analyzing Vulnerability
  of Electricity Distribution Networks to DER
  Disruptions". 2015 American Control Conference,
  2461-2468, 2015.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{ShelarAmin15_AnalyzingVulnerabilityOfElectricityDistributionNetworks,
      author = {Devendra Shelar and Saurabh Amin},
      title = {Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity
                Distribution Networks to DER Disruptions},
      booktitle = {2015 American Control Conference},
      pages = {2461-2468},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {We formulate a sequential (Stackelberg) game for
                assessing the vulnerability of radial electricity
                distribution networks to disruptions in
                Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). In this
                model, the attacker disrupts a subset of DER nodes
                by remotely manipulating the set-points of their
                inverters. The defender (network operator)
                responds by controlling the noncompromised DERs
                and by imposing partial load reduction via direct
                load control. The attacker’s (resp.
                defender’s) objective is to maximize (resp.
                minimize) the weighted sum of cost due to the loss
                of voltage regulation and the cost of load
                control. For the sequential play game where the
                attacker (resp. defender) is the leader (resp.
                follower) and under linear power flow equations,
                we show that the problem reduces to standard
                bilevel network interdiction problem. Under our
                assumptions on the attack model, we obtain a
                structural insight that the attacker’s optimal
                strategy is to compromise the downstream DER nodes
                as opposed to the upstream ones. We present a
                small case study to demonstrate the applicability
                of our model for vulnerability assessment of
                distribution networks.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/133.html}
  }
  

Posted by Saurabh Amin on 15 Apr 2016.
Groups: forces
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