Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity Distribution Networks to DER Disruptions
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin

Citation
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. "Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity Distribution Networks to DER Disruptions". 2015 American Control Conference, 2461-2468, 2015.

Abstract
We formulate a sequential (Stackelberg) game for assessing the vulnerability of radial electricity distribution networks to disruptions in Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). In this model, the attacker disrupts a subset of DER nodes by remotely manipulating the set-points of their inverters. The defender (network operator) responds by controlling the noncompromised DERs and by imposing partial load reduction via direct load control. The attacker’s (resp. defender’s) objective is to maximize (resp. minimize) the weighted sum of cost due to the loss of voltage regulation and the cost of load control. For the sequential play game where the attacker (resp. defender) is the leader (resp. follower) and under linear power flow equations, we show that the problem reduces to standard bilevel network interdiction problem. Under our assumptions on the attack model, we obtain a structural insight that the attacker’s optimal strategy is to compromise the downstream DER nodes as opposed to the upstream ones. We present a small case study to demonstrate the applicability of our model for vulnerability assessment of distribution networks.

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Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. <a
    href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/133.html"
    >Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity Distribution
    Networks to DER Disruptions</a>, 2015 American Control
    Conference, 2461-2468, 2015.
  • Plain text
    Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. "Analyzing Vulnerability
    of Electricity Distribution Networks to DER
    Disruptions". 2015 American Control Conference,
    2461-2468, 2015.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{ShelarAmin15_AnalyzingVulnerabilityOfElectricityDistributionNetworks,
        author = {Devendra Shelar and Saurabh Amin},
        title = {Analyzing Vulnerability of Electricity
                  Distribution Networks to DER Disruptions},
        booktitle = {2015 American Control Conference},
        pages = {2461-2468},
        year = {2015},
        abstract = {We formulate a sequential (Stackelberg) game for
                  assessing the vulnerability of radial electricity
                  distribution networks to disruptions in
                  Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). In this
                  model, the attacker disrupts a subset of DER nodes
                  by remotely manipulating the set-points of their
                  inverters. The defender (network operator)
                  responds by controlling the noncompromised DERs
                  and by imposing partial load reduction via direct
                  load control. The attackerâs (resp.
                  defenderâs) objective is to maximize (resp.
                  minimize) the weighted sum of cost due to the loss
                  of voltage regulation and the cost of load
                  control. For the sequential play game where the
                  attacker (resp. defender) is the leader (resp.
                  follower) and under linear power flow equations,
                  we show that the problem reduces to standard
                  bilevel network interdiction problem. Under our
                  assumptions on the attack model, we obtain a
                  structural insight that the attackerâs optimal
                  strategy is to compromise the downstream DER nodes
                  as opposed to the upstream ones. We present a
                  small case study to demonstrate the applicability
                  of our model for vulnerability assessment of
                  distribution networks.},
        URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/133.html}
    }
    

Posted by Saurabh Amin on 15 Apr 2016.
Groups: forces
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