Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks under DER Node Compromises
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin

Citation
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. "Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks under DER Node Compromises". IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS, 2016.

Abstract
This article focuses on the security assessment of electricity distribution networks (DNs) with vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation set-points. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A 3-stage Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation set-points; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and uncompromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by tractable formulations based on linear power flows. The set of critical DER nodes and the set-point manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are characterized. An iterative greedy approach to compute attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in pre- and post-attack conditions, respectively.

Electronic downloads

Internal. This publication has been marked by the author for FORCES-only distribution, so electronic downloads are not available without logging in.

Citation formats

• HTML

  Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/136.html"
  >Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks
  under DER Node Compromises</a>, <i>IEEE
  TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS</i>,  2016.

• Plain text

  Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin. "Security Assessment of
  Electricity Distribution Networks under DER Node
  Compromises". <i>IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF
  NETWORK SYSTEMS</i>,  2016.

• BibTeX

  @article{ShelarAmin16_SecurityAssessmentOfElectricityDistributionNetworksUnder,
      author = {Devendra Shelar and Saurabh Amin},
      title = {Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution
                Networks under DER Node Compromises},
      journal = {IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {This article focuses on the security assessment of
                electricity distribution networks (DNs) with
                vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER)
                nodes. The adversary model is simultaneous
                compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation
                of generation set-points. The loss to the defender
                (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation
                and cost of induced load control under
                supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A
                3-stage Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) game is
                formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a
                security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes;
                in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of
                vulnerable DERs and injects false generation
                set-points; in Stage 3, the defender responds by
                controlling loads and uncompromised DERs. Solving
                this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to
                nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision
                variables. To address this challenge, the problem
                is approximated by tractable formulations based on
                linear power flows. The set of critical DER nodes
                and the set-point manipulations characterizing the
                optimal attack strategy are characterized. An
                iterative greedy approach to compute
                attacker-defender strategies for the original
                nonlinear problem is proposed. These results
                provide guidelines for optimal security investment
                and defender response in pre- and post-attack
                conditions, respectively.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/136.html}
  }
  

Posted by Saurabh Amin on 15 Apr 2016.
Groups: forces
For additional information, see the Publications FAQ or contact webmaster at cps-forces org.