Citation
Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. "Optimal Contract Design for Energy Procurement". 52nd IEEE Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, 2014.

Abstract
We consider a mechanism design problem for strategic agents with multi-dimensional private information and uncertainty in their utility/cost functions. We show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of contracts that can be implemented as a nonlinear pricing scheme. We illustrate the result by considering an optimal energy procurement mechanism from a strategic seller with conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants. We address the problem of risk-sharing and ex post voluntary participation (commitment) under uncertainty.

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• HTML

  Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/152.html"
  >Optimal Contract Design for Energy
  Procurement</a>, 52nd IEEE Annual Allerton Conference
  on Communication, Control, and Computing, 2014.

• Plain text

  Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. "Optimal
  Contract Design for Energy Procurement". 52nd IEEE
  Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
  Computing, 2014.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{TavafoghiTeneketzis14_OptimalContractDesignForEnergyProcurement,
      author = {Hamidreza Tavafoghi and Demos Teneketzis},
      title = {Optimal Contract Design for Energy Procurement},
      booktitle = {52nd IEEE Annual Allerton Conference on
                Communication, Control, and Computing},
      year = {2014},
      abstract = {We consider a mechanism design problem for
                strategic agents with multi-dimensional private
                information and uncertainty in their utility/cost
                functions. We show that the optimal mechanism is a
                menu of contracts that can be implemented as a
                nonlinear pricing scheme. We illustrate the result
                by considering an optimal energy procurement
                mechanism from a strategic seller with
                conventional (deterministic) and renewable
                (random) plants. We address the problem of
                risk-sharing and ex post voluntary participation
                (commitment) under uncertainty.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/152.html}
  }
  

Posted by Hamidreza Tavafoghi on 23 May 2016.
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