Citation
Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. "Multi-Dimensional Forward Contracts under Uncertainty for Electricity Markets". IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 2016.

Abstract
We consider mechanism design problems for strategic agents with multi-dimensional private information and uncertainty in their utility/cost function. We show that the optimal mechanism with firm allocation can be implemented as a nonlinear pricing scheme, and the optimal mechanism with random allocation can be implemented as a menu of nonlinear pricing schemes.We provide two examples to demonstrate the results: an optimal energy procurement mechanism from a strategic seller with renewable (random) generation, and the design of an optimal demand response program for a network of heterogeneous loads.

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• HTML

  Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/153.html"
  >Multi-Dimensional Forward Contracts under Uncertainty
  for Electricity Markets</a>, <i>IEEE
  Transactions on Control of Network Systems</i>,  2016.

• Plain text

  Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis.
  "Multi-Dimensional Forward Contracts under Uncertainty
  for Electricity Markets". <i>IEEE Transactions on
  Control of Network Systems</i>,  2016.

• BibTeX

  @article{TavafoghiTeneketzis16_MultiDimensionalForwardContractsUnderUncertaintyFor,
      author = {Hamidreza Tavafoghi and Demos Teneketzis},
      title = {Multi-Dimensional Forward Contracts under
                Uncertainty for Electricity Markets},
      journal = {IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {We consider mechanism design problems for
                strategic agents with multi-dimensional private
                information and uncertainty in their utility/cost
                function. We show that the optimal mechanism with
                firm allocation can be implemented as a nonlinear
                pricing scheme, and the optimal mechanism with
                random allocation can be implemented as a menu of
                nonlinear pricing schemes.We provide two examples
                to demonstrate the results: an optimal energy
                procurement mechanism from a strategic seller with
                renewable (random) generation, and the design of
                an optimal demand response program for a network
                of heterogeneous loads.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/153.html}
  }
  

Posted by Hamidreza Tavafoghi on 23 May 2016.
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