Dynamic oligopoly games with private Markovian dynamics
Yi Ouyang, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis

Citation
Yi Ouyang, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. "Dynamic oligopoly games with private Markovian dynamics". 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2015.

Abstract
We analyze a dynamic oligopoly model with strategic sellers and buyers/consumers over a finite horizon. Each seller has private information described by a finite-state Markov process; the Markov processes describing the sellers' information are mutually independent. At the beginning of each time/stage t the sellers simultaneously post the prices for their good; subsequently, consumers make their buying decisions; finally, after the buyers' decisions are made, a public signal, indicating the buyers' consumption experience from each seller's good becomes available and the whole process moves to stage t + 1. The sellers' prices, the buyers' decisions and the signal indicating the buyers' consumption experience are common knowledge among buyers and sellers. This dynamic oligopoly model arises in online shopping and dynamic spectrum sharing markets. The model gives rise to a stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric information. Using ideas from the common information approach, we prove the existence of common information based equilibria. We obtain a sequential decomposition of the game and we provide a backward induction algorithm to determine common information-based equilibria that are perfect Bayesian equilibria. We illustrate our results with an example.

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  • HTML
    Yi Ouyang, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis. <a
    href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/154.html"
    >Dynamic oligopoly games with private Markovian
    dynamics</a>, 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and
    Control (CDC), 2015.
  • Plain text
    Yi Ouyang, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demos Teneketzis.
    "Dynamic oligopoly games with private Markovian
    dynamics". 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
    (CDC), 2015.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{OuyangTavafoghiTeneketzis15_DynamicOligopolyGamesWithPrivateMarkovianDynamics,
        author = {Yi Ouyang and Hamidreza Tavafoghi and Demos
                  Teneketzis},
        title = {Dynamic oligopoly games with private Markovian
                  dynamics},
        booktitle = {54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)},
        year = {2015},
        abstract = {We analyze a dynamic oligopoly model with
                  strategic sellers and buyers/consumers over a
                  finite horizon. Each seller has private
                  information described by a finite-state Markov
                  process; the Markov processes describing the
                  sellers' information are mutually independent. At
                  the beginning of each time/stage t the sellers
                  simultaneously post the prices for their good;
                  subsequently, consumers make their buying
                  decisions; finally, after the buyers' decisions
                  are made, a public signal, indicating the buyers'
                  consumption experience from each seller's good
                  becomes available and the whole process moves to
                  stage t + 1. The sellers' prices, the buyers'
                  decisions and the signal indicating the buyers'
                  consumption experience are common knowledge among
                  buyers and sellers. This dynamic oligopoly model
                  arises in online shopping and dynamic spectrum
                  sharing markets. The model gives rise to a
                  stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric
                  information. Using ideas from the common
                  information approach, we prove the existence of
                  common information based equilibria. We obtain a
                  sequential decomposition of the game and we
                  provide a backward induction algorithm to
                  determine common information-based equilibria that
                  are perfect Bayesian equilibria. We illustrate our
                  results with an example.},
        URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/154.html}
    }
    

Posted by Hamidreza Tavafoghi on 23 May 2016.
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