Electricity Pooling Markets with Elastic Demand: A Mechanism Design Approach
Mohammad Rasouli, Demos Teneketzis

Citation
Mohammad Rasouli, Demos Teneketzis. "Electricity Pooling Markets with Elastic Demand: A Mechanism Design Approach". Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2014 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE,, 2014.

Abstract
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is represented by a non-strategic agent. We consider demand to be elastic. We propose a market mechanism that has the following features. (F1) It is individually rational. (F2) It is budget balanced. (F3) It is price efficient, that is, at equilibrium the price of electricity is equal to the marginal cost of production. (F4) The energy production profile corresponding to every nonzero Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a solution of the corresponding centralized problem where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the producers' and consumers' utilities. We identify some open problems associated with our approach to electricity pooling markets.

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  • HTML
    Mohammad Rasouli, Demos Teneketzis. <a
    href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/157.html"
    >Electricity Pooling Markets with Elastic Demand: A
    Mechanism Design Approach</a>, Communication, Control,
    and Computing (Allerton), 2014 52nd Annual Allerton
    Conference on. IEEE,, 2014.
  • Plain text
    Mohammad Rasouli, Demos Teneketzis. "Electricity
    Pooling Markets with Elastic Demand: A Mechanism Design
    Approach". Communication, Control, and Computing
    (Allerton), 2014 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE,,
    2014.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{RasouliTeneketzis14_ElectricityPoolingMarketsWithElasticDemandMechanism,
        author = {Mohammad Rasouli and Demos Teneketzis},
        title = {Electricity Pooling Markets with Elastic Demand: A
                  Mechanism Design Approach},
        booktitle = {Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton),
                  2014 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE,},
        year = {2014},
        abstract = {In the restructured electricity industry,
                  electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with
                  strategic producers possessing private information
                  (private production cost function). We focus on
                  pooling markets where aggregate demand is
                  represented by a non-strategic agent. We consider
                  demand to be elastic. We propose a market
                  mechanism that has the following features. (F1) It
                  is individually rational. (F2) It is budget
                  balanced. (F3) It is price efficient, that is, at
                  equilibrium the price of electricity is equal to
                  the marginal cost of production. (F4) The energy
                  production profile corresponding to every nonzero
                  Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the
                  mechanism is a solution of the corresponding
                  centralized problem where the objective is the
                  maximization of the sum of the producers' and
                  consumers' utilities. We identify some open
                  problems associated with our approach to
                  electricity pooling markets.},
        URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/157.html}
    }
    

Posted by Mohammad Rasouli on 24 May 2016.
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