A decentralized mechanism for computing competitive equilibria in deregulated electricity markets
Erik Miehling, Demos Teneketzis

Citation
Erik Miehling, Demos Teneketzis. "A decentralized mechanism for computing competitive equilibria in deregulated electricity markets". American Control Conference (ACC), 4107-4113, 2016.

Abstract
With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures that, under the guidance of a market operator, self-interested market participants: generation companies (GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We show that even in the presence of informational asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power losses and transmission constraints), the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

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• HTML

  Erik Miehling, Demos Teneketzis. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/215.html"
  >A decentralized mechanism for computing competitive
  equilibria in deregulated electricity markets</a>,
  American Control Conference (ACC), 4107-4113, 2016.

• Plain text

  Erik Miehling, Demos Teneketzis. "A decentralized
  mechanism for computing competitive equilibria in
  deregulated electricity markets". American Control
  Conference (ACC), 4107-4113, 2016.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{MiehlingTeneketzis16_DecentralizedMechanismForComputingCompetitiveEquilibria,
      author = {Erik Miehling and Demos Teneketzis},
      title = {A decentralized mechanism for computing
                competitive equilibria in deregulated electricity
                markets},
      booktitle = {American Control Conference (ACC)},
      pages = {4107-4113},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {With the increased level of distributed generation
                and demand response comes the need for associated
                mechanisms that can perform well in the face of
                increasingly complex deregulated energy market
                structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we
                develop a decentralized market mechanism that
                ensures that, under the guidance of a market
                operator, self-interested market participants:
                generation companies (GenCos), distribution
                companies (DistCos), and transmission companies
                (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We
                show that even in the presence of informational
                asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power
                losses and transmission constraints), the
                resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto
                efficient.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/215.html}
  }
  

Posted by Erik Miehling on 17 Feb 2017.
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