Citation
Zhongjing Ma, Suli Zou, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens. "Efficient Coordination of Electric Vehicle Charging using a Progressive Second Price Auction". American Control Conference, 2999-3006, July, 2015.

Abstract
An auction-based game is formulated for coordinating the charging of a population of electric vehicles (EVs) over a finite horizon. The proposed auction requires individual EVs to submit bid profiles that have dimension equal to two times the number of time-steps in the horizon. They compete for energy allocation at each time-step. Use of the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism ensures that incentive compatibility holds for the auction game. However, due to cross-elasticity between the charging time-steps, the marginal valuation of an individual EV at a particular time is determined by both the demand at that time and the total demand over the entire horizon. This difficulty is addressed by partitioning the allowable set of bid profiles according to the total desired energy over the entire horizon. It is shown that the efficient bid profile over the charging horizon is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying auction game. A dynamic update mechanism for the auction game is designed. A numerical example demonstrates that the auction system converges to the efficient Nash equilibrium.

Electronic downloads

• 07171793.pdf · application/pdf · 195 kbytes

• HTML

  Zhongjing Ma, Suli Zou, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/226.html"
  >Efficient Coordination of Electric Vehicle Charging
  using a Progressive Second Price Auction</a>, American
  Control Conference, 2999-3006, July, 2015.

• Plain text

  Zhongjing Ma, Suli Zou, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens.
  "Efficient Coordination of Electric Vehicle Charging
  using a Progressive Second Price Auction". American
  Control Conference, 2999-3006, July, 2015.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{MaZouLiuHiskens15_EfficientCoordinationOfElectricVehicleChargingUsingProgressive,
      author = {Zhongjing Ma and Suli Zou and Xiangdong Liu and
                Ian Hiskens},
      title = {Efficient Coordination of Electric Vehicle
                Charging using a Progressive Second Price Auction},
      booktitle = {American Control Conference},
      pages = {2999-3006},
      month = {July},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {An auction-based game is formulated for
                coordinating the charging of a population of
                electric vehicles (EVs) over a finite horizon. The
                proposed auction requires individual EVs to submit
                bid profiles that have dimension equal to two
                times the number of time-steps in the horizon.
                They compete for energy allocation at each
                time-step. Use of the progressive second price
                (PSP) auction mechanism ensures that incentive
                compatibility holds for the auction game. However,
                due to cross-elasticity between the charging
                time-steps, the marginal valuation of an
                individual EV at a particular time is determined
                by both the demand at that time and the total
                demand over the entire horizon. This difficulty is
                addressed by partitioning the allowable set of bid
                profiles according to the total desired energy
                over the entire horizon. It is shown that the
                efficient bid profile over the charging horizon is
                a Nash equilibrium of the underlying auction game.
                A dynamic update mechanism for the auction game is
                designed. A numerical example demonstrates that
                the auction system converges to the efficient Nash
                equilibrium.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/226.html}
  }
  

Posted by Ian Hiskens on 28 Feb 2017.
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