Citation
Aron Laszka, Galina A. Schwartz. "Becoming Cybercriminals: Incentives in Networks with Interdependent Security". 7th Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), November, 2016.

Abstract
We study users’ incentives to become cybercriminals when network security is interdependent. We present a game-theoretic model in which each player (i.e., network user) decides his type, honest or malicious. Honest users represent law-abiding network users, while malicious users represent cybercriminals. After deciding on their types, the users make their security choices. We will follow [29], where breach probabilities for large-scale networks are obtained from a standard interdependent security (IDS) setup. In large-scale IDS networks, the breach probability of each player becomes a function of two variables: the player’s own security action and network security, which is an aggregate characteristic of the network; network security is computed from the security actions of the individual nodes that comprise the network. This allows us to quantify user security choices in networks with IDS even when users have only very limited, aggregate information about security choices of other users of the network.

Electronic downloads

• http://aronlaszka.com/papers/laszka2016becoming.pdf

• HTML

  Aron Laszka, Galina A. Schwartz. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/250.html"
  >Becoming Cybercriminals: Incentives in Networks with
  Interdependent Security</a>, 7th Conference on
  Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec), November,
  2016.

• Plain text

  Aron Laszka, Galina A. Schwartz. "Becoming
  Cybercriminals: Incentives in Networks with Interdependent
  Security". 7th Conference on Decision and Game Theory
  for Security (GameSec), November, 2016.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{LaszkaSchwartz16_BecomingCybercriminalsIncentivesInNetworksWithInterdependent,
      author = {Aron Laszka and Galina A. Schwartz},
      title = {Becoming Cybercriminals: Incentives in Networks
                with Interdependent Security},
      booktitle = {7th Conference on Decision and Game Theory for
                Security (GameSec)},
      month = {November},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {We study users’ incentives to become
                cybercriminals when network security is
                interdependent. We present a game-theoretic model
                in which each player (i.e., network user) decides
                his type, honest or malicious. Honest users
                represent law-abiding network users, while
                malicious users represent cybercriminals. After
                deciding on their types, the users make their
                security choices. We will follow [29], where
                breach probabilities for large-scale networks are
                obtained from a standard interdependent security
                (IDS) setup. In large-scale IDS networks, the
                breach probability of each player becomes a
                function of two variables: the player’s own
                security action and network security, which is an
                aggregate characteristic of the network; network
                security is computed from the security actions of
                the individual nodes that comprise the network.
                This allows us to quantify user security choices
                in networks with IDS even when users have only
                very limited, aggregate information about security
                choices of other users of the network.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/250.html}
  }
  

Posted by Waseem Abbas on 2 Mar 2017.
Groups: forces
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