Citation
Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. "Decentralization and security in dynamic traffic light control". Symposium and Bootcamp on Science of Security, 2016.

Abstract
Complex traffic networks include a number of controlled intersections, and, commonly, multiple districts or municipalities. The result is that the overall traffic control problem is extremely complex computationally. Moreover, given that different municipalities may have distinct, non-aligned, interests, traffic light controller design is inherently decentralized, a consideration that is almost entirely absent from related literature. Both complexity and decentralization have great bearing both on the quality of the traffic network overall, as well as on its security. We consider both of these issues in a dynamic traffic network. First, we propose an effective local search algorithm to efficiently design system-wide control logic for a collection of intersections. Second, we propose a game theoretic (Stackelberg game) model of traffic network security in which an attacker can deploy denial-of-service attacks on sensors, and develop a resilient control algorithm to mitigate such threats. Finally, we propose a game theoretic model of decentralization, and investigate this model both in the context of baseline traffic network design, as well as resilient design accounting for attacks. Our methods are implemented and evaluated using a simple traffic network scenario in SUMO.

Electronic downloads

• http://vorobeychik.com/2016/decsec.pdf

• HTML

  Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/254.html"
  >Decentralization and security in dynamic traffic light
  control</a>, Symposium and Bootcamp on Science of
  Security, 2016.

• Plain text

  Jian Lou, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. "Decentralization and
  security in dynamic traffic light control". Symposium
  and Bootcamp on Science of Security, 2016.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{LouVorobeychik16_DecentralizationSecurityInDynamicTrafficLightControl,
      author = {Jian Lou and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik},
      title = {Decentralization and security in dynamic traffic
                light control},
      booktitle = {Symposium and Bootcamp on Science of Security},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {Complex traffic networks include a number of
                controlled intersections, and, commonly, multiple
                districts or municipalities. The result is that
                the overall traffic control problem is extremely
                complex computationally. Moreover, given that
                different municipalities may have distinct,
                non-aligned, interests, traffic light controller
                design is inherently decentralized, a
                consideration that is almost entirely absent from
                related literature. Both complexity and
                decentralization have great bearing both on the
                quality of the traffic network overall, as well as
                on its security. We consider both of these issues
                in a dynamic traffic network. First, we propose an
                effective local search algorithm to efficiently
                design system-wide control logic for a collection
                of intersections. Second, we propose a game
                theoretic (Stackelberg game) model of traffic
                network security in which an attacker can deploy
                denial-of-service attacks on sensors, and develop
                a resilient control algorithm to mitigate such
                threats. Finally, we propose a game theoretic
                model of decentralization, and investigate this
                model both in the context of baseline traffic
                network design, as well as resilient design
                accounting for attacks. Our methods are
                implemented and evaluated using a simple traffic
                network scenario in SUMO. },
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/254.html}
  }
  

Posted by Waseem Abbas on 2 Mar 2017.
Groups: forces
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