Security games on a plane
Jiarui Gan, Bo An, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Brian Gauch

Citation
Jiarui Gan, Bo An, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Brian Gauch. "Security games on a plane". AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017.

Abstract
Most existing models of Stackelberg security games ignore the underlying topology of the space in which targets and defence resources are located. As a result, allocation of resources is restricted to a discrete collection of exogenously defined targets. However, in many practical security settings, defense resources can be located on a continuous plane. Better defense solutions could therefore be potentially achieved by placing resources in a space outside of actual targets (e.g., between targets). To address this limitation, we propose a model called Security Game on a Plane (SGP) in which targets are distributed on a 2-dimensional plane, and security resources, to be allocated on the same plane, protect targets within a certain effective distance. We investigate the algorithmic aspects of SGP. We find that computing a strong Stackelberg equilibrium of an SGP is NP-hard even for zerosum games, and these are inapproximable in general. On the positive side, we find an exact solution technique for general SGPs based on an existing approach, and develop a PTAS (polynomial-time approximation scheme) for zero-sum SGP to more fundamentally overcome the computational obstacle. Our experiments demonstrate the value of considering SGP and effectiveness of our algorithms.

Electronic downloads


Internal. This publication has been marked by the author for use only by the author.
Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Jiarui Gan, Bo An, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Brian Gauch. <a
    href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/255.html"
    >Security games on a plane</a>, AAAI Conference on
    Artificial Intelligence, 2017.
  • Plain text
    Jiarui Gan, Bo An, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Brian Gauch.
    "Security games on a plane". AAAI Conference on
    Artificial Intelligence, 2017.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{GanAnVorobeychikGauch17_SecurityGamesOnPlane,
        author = {Jiarui Gan and Bo An and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and
                  Brian Gauch},
        title = {Security games on a plane},
        booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
        year = {2017},
        abstract = {Most existing models of Stackelberg security games
                  ignore the underlying topology of the space in
                  which targets and defence resources are located.
                  As a result, allocation of resources is restricted
                  to a discrete collection of exogenously defined
                  targets. However, in many practical security
                  settings, defense resources can be located on a
                  continuous plane. Better defense solutions could
                  therefore be potentially achieved by placing
                  resources in a space outside of actual targets
                  (e.g., between targets). To address this
                  limitation, we propose a model called Security
                  Game on a Plane (SGP) in which targets are
                  distributed on a 2-dimensional plane, and security
                  resources, to be allocated on the same plane,
                  protect targets within a certain effective
                  distance. We investigate the algorithmic aspects
                  of SGP. We find that computing a strong
                  Stackelberg equilibrium of an SGP is NP-hard even
                  for zerosum games, and these are inapproximable in
                  general. On the positive side, we find an exact
                  solution technique for general SGPs based on an
                  existing approach, and develop a PTAS
                  (polynomial-time approximation scheme) for
                  zero-sum SGP to more fundamentally overcome the
                  computational obstacle. Our experiments
                  demonstrate the value of considering SGP and
                  effectiveness of our algorithms. },
        URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/255.html}
    }
    

Posted by Waseem Abbas on 2 Mar 2017.
Groups: forces
For additional information, see the Publications FAQ or contact webmaster at cps-forces org.

Notice: This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright.