Competitive Outcomes in the Data Market: Statistical Estimation in a Strategic Setting
Tyler Westenbroek

Citation
Tyler Westenbroek. "Competitive Outcomes in the Data Market: Statistical Estimation in a Strategic Setting". Talk or presentation, 24, August, 2017.

Abstract
We introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users are effort-averse (i.e. prefer to submit lower-quality estimates) and the data aggregator cannot observe the effort exerted by the users (i.e. the contract suffers from the principal-agent problem). However, we have shown that these mechanisms often break down in more realistic models, where multiple data aggregators are in competition. Our work motivates the need to introduce more robust, socially equitable pricing mechanisms or introduce a regulatory framework to mitigate the inefficiencies that arise in the data market.

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Citation formats

• HTML

  Tyler Westenbroek. <a
  href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/279.html"
  ><i>Competitive Outcomes in the Data Market:
  Statistical Estimation in a Strategic
  Setting</i></a>, Talk or presentation,  24,
  August, 2017.

• Plain text

  Tyler Westenbroek. "Competitive Outcomes in the Data
  Market: Statistical Estimation in a Strategic Setting".
  Talk or presentation,  24, August, 2017.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Westenbroek17_CompetitiveOutcomesInDataMarketStatisticalEstimation,
      author = {Tyler Westenbroek},
      title = {Competitive Outcomes in the Data Market:
                Statistical Estimation in a Strategic Setting},
      day = {24},
      month = {August},
      year = {2017},
      abstract = {We introduce a preliminary model for interactions
                in the data market. Recent research has shown ways
                in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms
                for users to ensure the quality of data, even in
                situations where the users are effort-averse (i.e.
                prefer to submit lower-quality estimates) and the
                data aggregator cannot observe the effort exerted
                by the users (i.e. the contract suffers from the
                principal-agent problem). However, we have shown
                that these mechanisms often break down in more
                realistic models, where multiple data aggregators
                are in competition. Our work motivates the need to
                introduce more robust, socially equitable pricing
                mechanisms or introduce a regulatory framework to
                mitigate the inefficiencies that arise in the data
                market.},
      URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/279.html}
  }
  

Posted by Carolyn Winter on 24 Aug 2017.
Groups: forces
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