

EMR: The Security-Productivity Dichotomy



Services Science, Management, Engineering

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Security Implications of EMR Implementation

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Goals of an EMR

→ Improved efficiency & productivity:

- ▶ Better coordination of care, virtually and physically
 - Fewer call-backs from pharmacies
 - Reduction in “phone tag”
- ▶ Reduction in “hunting and gathering”
- ▶ Broad access to the chart (by more than one person at a time)
- ▶ Better and standardized presentation of diverse data
- ▶ Reduction in redundant data

→ Cost reduction:

- ▶ Reduced transcription costs
- ▶ Reduce Labor costs
- ▶ Reduced internal/external copying expenses
- ▶ Malpractice insurance costs
- ▶ Pharmacy costs

→ Revenue enhancement:

- ▶ Improved documentation, coding
- ▶ Better billing

→ Improvement in quality of care

- ▶ Built-in protocols and reminders (including health maintenance)
- ▶ Improved medication management, medical errors
- ▶ Improved care coordination internally and externally (RHIOs)

Difficult Path to EMR Goals

→ Many Sources and Sinks of data

▶ **Integration**

▶ **Interfaces**

- Require constant human intervention, monitoring, patching
- Intellectual propriety v. seamless operation

▶ Many **diverse security coordination, models, access controls**

- Average 300 bed community hospital houses 200+ systems
- ~ 20 of these are “life critical”
- Many versions, patches, O/S, data formats
- Upgrades often not possible or practical

→ Preserving (clinical) **productivity is paramount**

▶ Responsibility of clinical productivity is shifted to IT professionals

- E.g. \$750,000 for 1 wk of malware remediation in one department
- **Poor audit trailing** and tools
- **Poor automation** of security → propagation of error

▶ Cultural issues impact chain of trust:

- Workflow is key– **giving/revoking rights** takes too much time / effort
- Organizational issues and HR incentives don't support security

▶ SSO and automated / context-sensitive security is not perfect

Difficult Path to EMR Goals

→ Patients:

- ▶ Largely trust the health system
- ▶ **Assume and Expect** that security (and privacy, confidentiality, continuity) are being maintained.
- ▶ Sue if it isn't
- ▶ Privacy issues loom for RHIO and PHR projects
 - Selective disclosure v. incidental disclosure v. "break the glass" disclosure

→ WILDCARD: **convergence of biomed and IT**

- ▶ Risk profiling for now... but will it scale?
- ▶ No host-based security
- ▶ How do you patch an implantable pump? Who bears the responsibility?

→ Lessons from **Katrina and Rita**

- ▶ Biometric failure— blood and body fluids, hoarse voices, new personnel
- ▶ Surge capacity in IT needs to support and follow surge capacity in hospital
 - The interesting role of the parking lot
- ▶ New applications of continuity, survivable systems

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