

Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology
Women's Institute in Summer Enrichment

Building Systems to Support Health Information Privacy


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 Vanderbilt University

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Disclaimer

- **Privacy** is an overloaded word
- Today: **privacy** in the context of a specific domain
- Healthcare
 - Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA)
 - NIH Data Sharing Policy
 - NIH Genome Wide Association Study Data Sharing Policy

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What's Going On?

- We study “privacy” in various operational realms
 - Primary Care
 - Clinical Information Systems Design
 - “Intelligent” Auditing
 - Secondary Uses
 - De-identification / Re-identification / Anonymization
 - Secure Data Integration and Analysis

Privacy Everywhere

- We do not always control who gets, and has access to, our information
- Legally, however, data collectors may be required to maintain your privacy

```

    graph TD
        DC[Data Collecting] --> DU[Data Using]
        DU --> DS[Data Sharing]
    
```

Privacy Everywhere

- Let's begin with data already in the system

```

    graph TD
        DC[Data Collecting] --> DU[Data Using]
        DU --> DS[Data Sharing]
    
```


Electronic Medical Records – Hooray!

- At V...
- And...
- Inc...

STAR PANEL

Clinical Information Systems Design


(Duncavage 2007; Mathe et al, 2008; Werner et al, 2007, 2008)




Surveillance (Paulett, Malin)



- Very little role-based access control in large academic medical centers! (why?)
- Most auditing is done manually! (why?)
- > 1.5 million patient records
- > 20,000 authorized users




Jan 1, 2006 • Users linked if accessed 1 common patient (~ 900 users, 2000 patients)




HORNET: Healthcare Organizational Research Toolkit

(<http://code.google.com/p/hornet/>)





Learning Policies and Anomalies from EMR Access Logs

- Extracts patterns from medical record access logs to model policies & detect "privacy" violations.



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Holy Hand Grenades! How Did You...

- Initially an institutionally funded project
- Office for Human Research Protections designation as Non-Human Subjects Research under 45 CFR 46 ("HIPAA Common Rule")*
 - Samples & data not linked to identity
 - Conducted with IRB & ethics oversight

*Roden D et al. Development of a large-scale de-identified DNA biobank to enable personalized medicine. Clin Pharmacol Ther. 2008; 84(3): 362-369.

HIPAA

(the ELEPHANT in the room)

- Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act
- Resolve state laws hampering standardization, transfer, & sharing of health information
- "covered entity" cannot use or disclose protected health information (PHI)
 - data "explicitly" linked to a particular individual, or
 - could reasonably be expected to allow individual identification

HIPAA - Secondary Data Sharing

- Safe Harbor
- Limited Release
- Statistical or Scientific Standard

HIPAA Safe Harbor

- Data that can be given away without oversight
- Requires removal of eighteen attributes
 - Names / Initials
 - Street address, city, county, precinct code and equivalent geocodes
 - All elements of dates, except year, and all ages over 89
 - #'s: Phone, Fax, Social Security, Medical Record, Health Plan ID, Account, License, Serial, Device
 - Web: Email, URL, IP addresses
 - Biometric identifiers: finger, voice prints
 - Full face photo images and comparable images
 - Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code
 - A code is an identifier if the person holding the coded data can re-identify the individual

HIPAA Limited Dataset

- Includes more specific information than Safe Harbor
- Can include
 - Dates of birth, death, service
 - Geographic Info: Town, Zip code, County
- **Requires Contract:** Research entity provides assurances that it will not use or disclose the information for purposes other than research and will not identify or contact the individuals who are the subjects

HIPAA Statistical / Scientific Standard

- Certify via “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods, that the risk is very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by the anticipated recipient to identify the subject of the information.”
- “Must document the methods and results of the analysis that justify such a determination”
- “Must not disclose the key or other mechanism that would have enabled the information to be re-identified”
 - includes pseudo-random number algorithms and seed values

“Scrubbing” Medical Records

Rules*
 Regular Expressions
 Dictionaries
 Exclusions

↓↓↓↓↓

Machine Learning – Conditional Random Fields**

Gupta D, et al. Evaluation of a deidentification (De-Id) software engine to share pathology reports and clinical documents for research. Am J Clin Pathol, 2004 Feb; 121(2): 176-186.
 **Wellner et al. Rapidly retargetable approaches to de-identification in medical records. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 2007.

“Scrubbed” Medical Record

Unknown residual re-identification potential (e.g. “the mayor’s wife”)

Technology + Policy

- Databank access restricted to Vanderbilt employees
- Must sign use agreement that prohibits “re-identification”
- Operations Advisory Board and Institutional Review Board approval needed for each project
- All data access logged and audited per project

To Vanderbilt and Beyond

The eMERGE Network
 electronic Medical Records & Genomics
 A consortium of biorepositories linked to electronic medical records data for conducting genomic studies

■ Consortium members (<http://www.gwas.net>)

- Group Health of Puget Sound (UW)
- Marshfield Clinic
- Mayo Clinic
- Northwestern University
- Vanderbilt University

■ Funding condition: contribute **de-identified** genomic and EMR-derived phenotype data to database of genotype and phenotype (dbGAP) at NCBI, NIH

Each center participating in the consortium, organized by the National Human Genome Research Institute

Data Sharing Policies

- Feb '03: National Institutes of Health Data Sharing Policy
 - “data should be made as widely & freely available as possible”
 - **researchers who receive >= \$500,000 must develop a data sharing plan or describe why data sharing is not possible**
 - Derived data must be shared in a manner that is devoid of “identifiable information”

- Aug '06: NIH Supported Genome-Wide Association Studies Policy
 - Researchers who received >= \$0 for GWAS

The Face that Launched a Thousand Ships

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Healthcare Reform At Work

- In 1997, approx. 44 of 50 states collected and disseminated hospital discharge data
- In 2005, approx. 47 of 50 states “ “
- Attributes recommended by *National Association of Health Data Organizations* for disclosure
 - Patient Zip Code
 - Patient Birth Date
 - Patient Gender
 - Patient Racial Background
 - Patient Number
 - Visit Date
 - Principle Diagnosis Codes (ICD-9)
 - Procedure Codes
 - Physician ID Number
 - Physician Zip Code
 - Total Charges

J. Schoenman et al. The value of hospital discharge databases. NORC & NAHDO. 2005. http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/final_report.pdf

Case Study – “Quasi-identifier”

Back in the '90s

Hospital Discharge Data

L. Sweeney. Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics. 1997. 31

Case Study – “Quasi-identifier”

Back in the '90s

City of Cambridge, MA Voter Registration Records

L. Sweeney. Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics. 1997. 32

Case Study – “Quasi-identifier”

Re-identification of William Weld

Hospital Discharge Data Voter List

L. Sweeney. Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics. 1997. 33

5-Digit Zip Code + Birthdate + Gender

63-87% of US estimated to be unique

L. Sweeney. Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the U.S Population. 2000.
P. Golle. Revisiting the Uniqueness of US Population. ACM WPES. 2006. 34

And Now, It's A Phenomenon!!!

The AOL Search Log Case (2006)

- Goal: Support web search research
- 650k customers, 20 million queries, 3 month period
- Names replaced with persistent pseudonyms

Name	Query	Date	Time	User	Query	Date	Time
John Doe	Books	1/2/05	16:52	8123	Books	1/2/05	16:52
Bob Smith	Payscale	1/4/05	23:41	9010	Payscale	1/4/05	23:41
John Doe	Porn	1/8/05	03:15	8123	Porn	1/8/05	03:15


Barbaro & Zeller. A face exposed for AOL searcher no. 4417749. New York Times. Aug 9, 2006.



Thelma Arnold & Dudley


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The Netflix Challenge (2008-2009)

- Netflix published movie selections of ~450,000 pseudonymized subscribers
- Re-identification via uniqueness of movie combinations



- Class action filed December 2009


A. Narayanan & V. Shmatikov IEE Security and Privacy Conference. 2008.

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

Samples
Samples
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and
Populations

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Re-identification ?




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Now Back to Your Regularly Scheduled Programming

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The Census? <http://factfinder.census.gov/>

U.S. Census Bureau

American FactFinder

POPULATION FINDER

Fast Access to Information

Get a Fact Sheet for your community.

city/town, county, or zip

state

or select a state using a map

Population Data

Use the Population Finder to view population trends for your community.

U.S. Population Clock

02:06 UTC (EST-4) Mar 22, 2010

308,913,405

now population_clock.a

What's New

ROAD FOUR LAUNCH



January 4th, 2010 Census Bureau Launches 2010 Census Road Tour across the nation!

2009 Population Estimates for the U.S. and states are now available from the Data Sets page

2008-2009 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates are now available for cities, counties and other areas with populations of 20,000 or more.

Beyond "unique"

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Policy Analysis via "Trust Differential" ...

Risk(Limited Dataset)
Risk(Safe Harbor)

- Uniques
 - Delaware's risk increases by a factor ~1,000
 - Tennessee's " " " " ~2,300
 - Illinois's " " " " ~65,000
- ≤20,000
 - Delaware's risk does not increase
 - Tennessee's risk increases by a factor of ~8
 - Illinois's risk increases by a factor of ~37

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State Policy

	IL	MN	TN	WA	WI
WHO???	Registered Political Committees (ANYONE – In Person)	MN Voters	Anyone	Anyone	Anyone
Format	Disk	Disk	Disk	Disk	Disk
Cost	\$500	\$46; "use ONLY for elections, political activities, or law enforcement"	\$2500	\$30	\$12,500
Voter ID	•	•	•	•	•
Name	•	•	•	•	•
Address	•	•	•	•	•
Voter Status	•	•	•	•	•
District Information	•	•	•	•	•
Election History	•	•	•	•	•
Date of Birth	•	○	•	•	•
Date of Registration	•	•	•	•	•
Sex	•	•	•	•	•
Race	•	•	•	•	•
Phone Number	•	•	•	•	•

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Cost?

State	Limited Dataset		Safe Harbor	
	Marker Risk	Cost per Re-id	Total Risk	Cost per Re-id
VA	3159764	\$0	221	\$0
NY	2905697	\$0	221	\$0
SC	2231973	\$0	1386	\$0
WI	72	\$174	2	\$6,250
WV	55	\$309	1	\$17,000
NH	10	\$827	1	\$8,267

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A Couple of Parting Thoughts

- The application of technology must be considered within the systems and operational processes they will be applied
- One person's vulnerability is another person's armor (variation in risks)
- It is possible to inject privacy into health information systems – but it must be done early (see "privacy by design")!
- Sometimes theory needs to be balanced with practicality

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