

Participants

Individuals

Enabling System Trust fo

US



People

L Jean Camp

infoecon.net

ljean.com

Brain

Surgeons

Outline

- Theoretical discussion of security decisions as risk communication
- Risk perception, expressed preference
- Example of two systems
- Intermittent examples

An Aside



Participants engage with us on risk decisions in a given
context.

Users Use (and are used by).

People Do Not Engage in the Calculus of Risk

- Consider two failures
 - A pop-up notification of a change in privacy policy
 - A display of another person's information (cc#, DoB, details)
 - Individuals responded significantly more strongly to the first
 - A failure in benevolence more critical than competence

Individual Risk Decision

- A specific person making a potentially irrational risk decision
 - Using local client records of that individual
 - Using risk perspectives from other domains
 - Depending on their mental models for decision guidance
- Solve the problem of the homophilus individual as well as the problem of the heterogeneous network

Decades of Consistent Security Training

Secure Connection Failed

i.broke.the.internet.and.all.i.got.was.this.t-shirt.phreedom.org uses an invalid security certificate.

The certificate is not trusted because the issuer certificate has expired. The certificate expired on 9/1/2004 6:00 PM.

(Error code: sec_error_expired_issuer_certificate)

- This could be a problem with the server's configuration, or it could be someone trying to impersonate the server.
- If you have connected to this server successfully in the past, the error may be temporary, and you can try again later.

[Or you can add an exception...](#)

Server Certificate Expired

"img.godaddy.com" is a site that uses a security certificate to encrypt data during transmission, but its certificate expired on 10/5/2006 12:49 PM.

You should check to make sure that your computer's time (currently set to Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:24:36 PM) is correct.

Would you like to continue anyway?

Details...

uses. It is usually safe to disable macros, but if the you might lose some functionality.

it to High. Therefore, you cannot enable macros do not trust.

s from this publisher.

Somehow there is still a problem

Why Usable Security is Not Usability

- People rarely want to perform security tasks
- People often want to subvert, minimize, or ignore security
- People need to trust their machines, achieving suspicion is not a goal

Usable Transparent Design

- Make the connection between action and consequence clear
- Risk is inherently probabilistic
 - There may be no consequence
 - Consequence is very likely to be delayed
 - Consequence may prove catastrophic
 - Action-risk-consequence information may be overwhelming

Opaque

- Security as a default
- Require explicit confirmation
- May be disabling
 - So individuals disable it

Opaque Stops Actions

▼ [Help me understand](#)

When you connect to a secure website, the server hosting that site presents your browser with something called a "certificate" to verify its identity. This certificate contains identity information, such as the address of the website, which is verified by a third party that your computer trusts. By checking that the address in the certificate matches the address of the website, it is possible to verify that you are securely communicating with the website you intended, and not a third party (such as an attacker on your network).

In this case, the certificate has not been verified by a third party that your computer trusts. Anyone can create a certificate claiming to be whatever website they choose, which is why it must be verified by a trusted third party. Without that verification, the identity information in the certificate is meaningless. It is therefore not possible to verify that you are communicating with **mail.google.com** instead of an attacker who generated his own certificate claiming to be **mail.google.com**. You should not proceed past this point.

If, however, you work in an organization that generates its own certificates, and you are trying to connect to an internal website of that organization using such a certificate, you may be able to solve this problem securely. You can import your organization's root certificate as a "root certificate", and then certificates issued or verified by your organization will be trusted and you will not see this error next time you try to connect to an internal website. Contact your organization's help staff for assistance in adding a new root certificate to your computer.

Translucent Security

- Context dependent
- Designed for the task and the risk
- A single interaction or narrative
- Incentives must be visible, but also participants must be allowed to pay the risk price
- Participants understand the context, security engineers understand the risk

Online and Offline Risks

- Offline risks inherently physical
- No true fear online
- Classic nine-dimensional risk perception model
- How can we use knowledge of offline risks to design security online?
 - Examine dimensions of perception that inform risk decisions

One of Nine

- Voluntariness or Involuntary



Smoking vs. Air pollution

Two of Nine

- Immediacy



Jaywalking vs. Global warming

Three of Nine

- Knowledge about the risk to the exposed



Genetically modified crops vs. a hot stove

Four of Nine

- Knowledge of the risk to science



Pharmaceutical interaction vs. alcohol

Five of Nine

- Controllability



Airplane crash vs. an automobile crash

Six of Nine

- Newness



Coal-burning facility vs. Catawba nuclear facility

Seven of Nine



- Common-Dread



Snake bite vs. the flu

Eight of Nine

- Chronic-Catastrophic



Nine of Nine

- Severity



Sky diving vs. chopping & cutting

What About Virtual Risks?

- Virus, Botnets, Trojan, Malware, Spam, Identify Theft, Phishing, Key Loggers, Surveillance, Worms, Virtual Stalking, Cookies, Zombies, Spoofing, and Spyware
- n=95

Computing Risks Are Not Scary or Scary ?

- Not apparently immediate
- Chronic
- Not dreadful
- Perceived as being understood by experts
- New
- Not understood
- **Severity!!**
- Voluntary?
- Uncontrollable?

Use What We Can

- Condensed to four dimension
 - temporal impact (newness and common-dread)
 - control (voluntariness and controllability)
 - familiarity (knowledge to science, knowledge to the exposed)
With Timely Warnings and Mitigation
 - impact (severity, chronic, immediacy)



Beyond Usability

- Computing will not be scary so mitigation has to be very easy
- Risk information may be unpleasant
- Visible user-action-system-consequence may be overwhelming or context-dependent
- Be timely, careful, targeted, & personalized

Voluntary & Uncontrollable?

- Folk Practices
 - Eavesdropping: Turn screens sideways
 - Big fish/ targeted crime: nothing
 - Infectious/street crime: back-up
 - Patching, rarely
 - Firewalls, never
 - Updated anti-virus: medical model, ubiquitous
- Current knowledge
 - Be careful what websites you visit
 - Don't click on attachments

Risk Communication

- Communication of specific risk
- Effective automation/ support of risk mitigation
- No communication is welcome if ill-timed

Phishing Video

- Informative
- Nontechnical
- Useful
- Actionable
- Grounds risk in an available mental model
- Makes risk appear immediate

Informative


WATCH OUT!!

THIS IS A BARREL

SOMETHING MAY BE IN IT



Useful?



Clear and Actionable



Sharing Firewall Active

The sharing firewall (System Preferences > Sharing > Firewall) is active. It may interfere with network profiling. The communication port-number range used by this application (7475 - 7480) should be added to the firewall's list of trusted service ports. Otherwise, network profiling will fail.

Ignore


Sharing...

Actionable?

Thank you for visiting!

You are Monday's Winner!

CONGRATULATIONS



Claim In:

119.8

03/7/2011

Grounded in Useful Mental Models



Reported Attack Page!

This web page at therealnews.com has been reported as an attack page and has been blocked based on your security preferences.

Attack pages try to install programs that steal private information, use your computer to attack others, or damage your system.

Some attack pages intentionally distribute harmful software, but many are compromised without the knowledge or permission of their owners.

Get me out of here!

Why was this page blocked?


[Ignore this warning](#)

Leave

Good
Luck!


Stay

A Safe Place: Technical



Structured the problem incorrectly, we lose by design

Identify the Bank



Good Luck!!

Trust and Context



vs.



Resource Verification
Which merchant is more established?

Trust and Context



VS.



Resource Verification
With whom will you bank?

One Story

- Instead of a plethora of add-ins, add-ons, and ever expanding vocabulary
- A single story with one metaphor about the context, and a path to mitigation
- Translucent security

Two Examples

- Certificates
 - Work in progress
- Risks at work
 - communicating risks in decision-making

Perspectives

- public “network notary” servers
 - monitor the SSL certificates
 - Advantage: covers 100,000s+ websites, text
 - Disadvantages: privacy, personalized coverage, notary incentives (all liability, no profit)

No One Is Here



We can figure this out. We have never been there. No one else is there either

You've Never Been Here

- Simple communication
- Single narrative
- Make their risks clear
 - You have never been here before, yet you are entering a password
 - Your friends have not been here
 - 95% are repeat clicks; 99% with n=10
- Individuals have incentives to protect themselves

History is Powerful

- Align with their mental models
- Integrate socially available information into the browsing or email experience
 - You don't know this site.
 - That's your bank password!
 - Perhaps you should call your bank first?

Other Options

- Enable them to utilize their social networks
 - None of your friends have been here
 - No one knows this site
- Use patterns and heuristics
 - Certificate chain
 - Rank date; level; signing party
 - Compare with trusted/ untrusted

Other Rating Options

- Those that have been previously visited are trusted
- Those that have not been previously visited are considered untrusted
- The ratings of an untrusted website comes from McAfee SiteAdvisor
- The workplace provides a list of trusted certificates



Do Not Assume, but Enable

- Use what we know
 - Where you have been
 - Identify & protect critical authenticating info
 - Identify context
 - Explicit (work, banking)
 - Implicit (play, family)
 - Minimize explicit user-rating actions


User-Centered Security

This is not a bank. If you enter this password, your money can be stolen.

This is a bank. Would you like assistance with your security settings?



Actionable & Nontechnical?



Accept this or the web

This web site is one day old. It is more likely than others to be dangerous. Don't go, or don't enter information, and don't download anything.

Do not accept any images or download anything from this site

The organization knows why this site can offer risk

Your plug-ins are still on, you are accepting serious risks to your machine and data

Don't enter any information in this site!

Disable all plug-ins.
Click [here](#).

Details, details

Warning: Visiting this site may harm your computer

The website you are visiting appears to contain malware. Malware is malicious software that may harm your computer or otherwise operate with your computer. You may be infected just by browsing this site. You should take further action on your part.

For detailed information about problems found on this site, or a portion of this site, visit [this](#) page for [hj3hdeu3.com](#).

Don't visit

How can I visit safely?

I want to take the risk.

Define Contexts

- Network
 - Known machines? Security level? Hostile behaviors?
- Client
 - Known behaviors? Connection patterns?
- Limit data portability
 - Each device learns either on its own or from a location-authenticated and shared-credential small set

Shared Histories

- Perfect forward secrecy
 - Shared key efficient, deniable
 - Device vs person
 - authentication vs invitation
- Cloud-stored encrypted
- Traffic and timing attacks possible
 - Enables identification of social networks

Coordinate Human/Technical/Organizational

- Three contexts: Banking, working, playing
 - Participant override with risk communication
 - Security settings, isolated memory spaces, limit/prevent credential reuse
 - Privacy settings
 - Workplace compliance?
 - Work because they fail

Example 2: Risk @Work

- The Insider is mostly benign
- Inadvertent creation of risk
- Complete the task at hand
- Security is someone else's problem

Risk Alignment

- Design a risk management mechanism
 - **inform** employees about organizational risk
 - **align** incentives between employees and organization
 - **identify** changes in status and risk behavior
 - **encourage** the users to self-manage their risks
 - **enable** them to get the job done

Risk Mitigation

- Provide each employee with a risk budget
 - access is priced
 - 1, 10, 100, break glass
 - create a long term record of aggregate risks
 - periodic review of employee risk behaviors

Budget as Risk Limit

- By the organization
- Based on
 - organizational preference
 - employee access rights
 - employee security preference
 - machine state
 - peer history
 - employee history

Simple Budget

- Risks are order of magnitude
- Risk points expire, no hoarding

Punishments?

- Translate exhausted budget into a cost
- An incentive against risk-seeking behaviors
 - enforced by the organization?
 - enforced by employee concern?
 - options
 - audit, training, limited access, verbal reminder, security review

Rewards

- A measure to reward the careful employee
- In the form of
 - more access
 - monetary award
 - opt-out of otherwise mandatory training
 - group competition
 - symbolic, e.g. atta-girl
 - accumulated
 - redeem

Experimental Configuration

- Two human-subject experiments
 - based on a firefox browser extension
- The 1st experiment
 - as benchmark
 - to understand users' risk behaviors
- The 2nd experiment
 - to study the change of risk behaviors

Experiment One

Screensavers – The Very Best from screensaver.com: Free and Custom Developed Screen Savers

http://www.screensaver.com

JavaScript Application

The website you are trying to visit is considered risky.
Are you willing to continue?

Cancel OK

NEW RELEASES SPECIAL PICK MOST POPULAR SEASONAL FAVORITES SCREENSAVER LIBRARY

Nothing but the best!

Search Screensavers Search

[Tech Support](#) | [Contact Us](#) | [About Us](#) | [Links](#) | [Free Games](#) [Club Log-In](#)

Screensaver Favorites

Featured Screensaver

Living 3D Dolphins

Swim with the dolphins in this deep sea adventure! This free

3D Falling Leaves

Watch as your cares drop away like the brilliantly colored leaves

PLAY FREE Games on Your Desktop!

Inclusion of Budget

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a URL bar containing "http://www.a...". A dialog box titled "[JavaScript Application]" is overlaid on the page. The dialog contains the following text: "The website you are trying to visit is considered risky. This visit to this website will cost 18 risk points. Are you willing to pay these 18 risk points to continue?" Below the text are "Cancel" and "OK" buttons. The background website is titled "Screensavers | Download Free Screensavers" and features a navigation menu with links like "Home", "Seasonal", "What's New", "Bookmark", "Make Your Own", "Free Content", "Link To Us", "Get The Klip", and "Advertise With Us". There are also sections for "Screensaver Search", "Live Saver Search", and "Top Downloads" with various links like "Living 3D Waterfalls 3.0" and "Living 3D Dolphins".

Screensavers | Download Free Screensavers

[JavaScript Application]

The website you are trying to visit is considered risky.

This visit to this website will cost 18 risk points.

Are you willing to pay these 18 risk points to continue?

Cancel OK

Home | Seasonal | What's New | Bookmark | Make Your Own | Free Content | Link To Us | Get The Klip | Advertise With Us

Top Screensavers: [Christmas](#) | [The Matrix](#) | [Thanksgiving](#) | [3D](#) | [Hot](#) | [Living Aquarium](#)

Screensavers

- :: [Cartoons](#)
- :: [Models](#)
- :: [3D](#)
- :: [Celebrities](#)
- :: [People](#)
- :: [Anime](#)
- :: [Fantasy](#)
- :: [Sports](#)

No matter what type of screensavers you're looking for, you'll find it here, among our comprehensive free screensaver listings. If you're weary of the lame, boring default screensavers that came with your computer, then try one of the many dazzling free screensavers we offer here. [Click Here](#) to bookmark our site in Internet Explorer or press **Ctrl+D** in Netscape!

[Free Screensavers](#)

Screensaver Search

enter keywords

Go Get It

Live Saver Search

Top 10 Searches




[fairys](#)

Top Downloads

- [Living 3D Waterfalls 3.0](#)
- [Living 3D Dolphins](#)
- [Living Marine Aquarium 2](#)
- [Lightning Storm 3D](#)

Ads by Google

Response to Risk Budget



Regulatory Friction

- The efforts made by the users to adopt a risk-averse strategy instead of a risk-seeking strategy
- Measured friction using time interval for completing the task
- 1st experiment 5:45
- 2nd experiment 6:00
- Regulatory friction of 4.3% of the time committed in experiment one

Security Behaviors Embed Trust and Risk

- Incentives must be
 - correctly aligned
 - clearly communicated
 - to change behavior
- Design path
 - mechanism design
 - simulations
 - human experimentation

Translucent Security

- Is not usable security
- Is not default security
- Is cooperative security based on risk communication
 - Computer and human as partners


A Safe Place: Clear, Actionable, Personalized

This web site steals information. Don't
share it.

-Or -

Reset and configure

-Or-



Provide mostly useless information

Thanks!

Browsing data structure?

What to ask?

Questions?

Note

- IEEE S&PW
 - Needed:
 - Site chair
 - Handle onsite issues, interact with chairs and S&P committee
 - 3rd yr; be on market soon; give people a face to match the name
 - Publications chair
 - After event, harass authors and chairs for camera-ready papers
 - Connect with senior people from a place of authority

What to Ask & Ask & Ask

- Get involved!
 - USACM; IEEE-USA
 - Mailing lists matter hcisec@yahoogroups.com, ias-opportunities@googlegroups.com
- Get funded!
 - Who has grants on your campus? In your area?
 - NSF
 - Capacity building, YI
 - DARPA note
 - Mudge's program?
 - NIH
 - Security & Privacy, YI, FI

Experimental Details



- Warning
- Bad wordy slides ahead
- Will abuse for attention span for funding

In Practice

- An employee
 - Internet surfing
 - documents downloading
 - a daily risk budget B
 - spend p_j to visit a website w_j that costs p_k to perform the downloading
 - spend p'_j to visit another website w'_j that costs p'_k to download
 - p_j, p_k, p'_j and p'_k are set by the organization based on its perception and evaluation of potential risks
 - assuming $B > (p_j + p_k) > (p'_j + p'_k)$
 - we expect she voluntarily chooses the second website, which incurs lower risks, under our risk budget mechanism

Experimental Configuration

- Two human-subject experiments
 - based on a firefox browser extension
- The 1st experiment
 - as benchmark
 - to understand users' risk behaviors
- The 2nd experiment
 - to study the change of risk behaviors

Recruitment

- 40 participants
- Voluntarily recruited from the undergraduates at Indiana University
- Randomly and equally divided into two group
- None of them have majors in computer related fields

Task Descriptions

1. Search for the websites offering free screen savers downloads from the web
2. From the search results, choose five websites: website-1, website-2, website-3, website-4 and website-5
3. From website-1, please take a screenshot of an {Animal, nature, sport, space, flower} screensaver
4. Repeat the same process for the other four websites
5. Thank you. You have completed the experiment

Experiment One

Screensavers – The Very Best from screensaver.com: Free and Custom Developed Screen Savers

http://www.screensaver.com

JavaScript Application

The website you are trying to visit is considered risky.
Are you willing to continue?

Cancel OK

NEW RELEASES SPECIAL PICK MOST POPULAR SEASONAL FAVORITES SCREENSAVER LIBRARY

Nothing but the best!

Search Screensavers Search

[Tech Support](#) | [Contact Us](#) | [About Us](#) | [Links](#) | [Free Games](#) [Club Log-In](#)

Screensaver Favorites

Featured Screensaver

Living 3D Dolphins

Swim with the dolphins in this deep sea adventure! This free

3D Falling Leaves

Watch as your cares drop away like the brilliantly colored leaves

PLAY FREE Games on Your Desktop!

Experiment Two

- 20 participants completed the same task under the additional constraint of their risk budgets
- If they successfully accomplished their tasks
 - receive \$10 plus a bonus
 - bonus based on the remaining risk points
- If any participant exhausted a risk budget
 - compensation forfeited
- If any participant failed to complete the experiment in time allowed
 - compensation forfeited

Firefox Browser Extension

1. Detect a new page being loaded;
2. Check the domain name of a webpage;
3. Maintain a list of target high risk websites and their reputations;
4. Pop up a warning message when a high risk website was about to be visited;
5. Ask for confirmation or rejection of the visit choice from the participant;
6. Record the experimental results;

(In experiment two, the extension also took the following actions:)

7. Generate a price based on a website's reputation;
8. Track participants risk budgets balance.

Data

- 1st experiment
 - 104 pop-up warning messages
 - 81 risk-seeking decisions
 - 23 risk-averse decisions
- 2nd experiment
 - 106 pop-up warning messages
 - 11 risk-seeking decisions
 - 95 risk-averse decisions

Game Theoretic Perspective

	Risk-Seeking	Risk-Averse
No Reward	$(-P_1, 0)$	$(-P_2, -C)$
Reward	$(-P_1-R_1, R_1)$	$(-P_2-R_2, R_2-C)$

- P_1 : the cost to the organization when a risk-seeking adopted
- P_2 : the cost to the organization when a risk-averse adopted
- $P_1 > P_2$
- R_1 : the reward to the user when a risk-seeking strategy is adopted
- R_2 : the reward to the user when a risk-averse strategy is adopted
- $R_1 < R_2$
- C : the friction between the risk-seeking and the risk-averse strategy

Game Solution and Application

- $R_1 < R_2 - C$ must hold
- (*reward, risk averse*) as equilibrium strategy in the repeated game
- It's critical to determine the parameters
 - C could be estimated from time difference observation
 - adjust the incentive functions and monitor the risks, until the risk behavior distribution becomes acceptable

NT Privacy & Security

- One-way connection between users and Net Trust ID
 - $\text{Hash}(\text{random}, \text{email}) = \langle \text{NetTrustID} \rangle$
 - Prevents invitation spamming with a single account
- Weaknesses
 - Content analysis can create identity
 - E.g. ljean.com
 - Traffic analysis for identity and social network (Tor integration)
- Rejected
 - Signatures to ensure data integrity
 - Want data to be subject to repudiation



Do Not Assume Trust

- Reputation based on
- Implicit based on behavior
 - First visit results in delayed rating
 - Time delay is roughly equivalent to lifetime of phishing sites 72hrs
 - 1-nth visit increased by one
 - Increases up to nth visit, decreases to as low as $n/2$ after a delay
 - ✓ Trust fades over time

Implementation Status

- Centralized storage and distribution of data
 - Immediate synchronization of peer data
- Social network management
 - Email invitation
 - Manual entry of peer credentials
- Privacy
 - Uncorrelated IDs -- deniable histories
 - History limited to domain+top directory (no CGI)
 - No credentials required for ratings download
 - SN downloads delayed to prevent timing attack

Architectural Overview

