

Experimental Embedded System Platform for System/Security Co-Design Matthew Eby, Janos Mathe, Jan Werner, Janos Sztipanovits, Gabor Karsai, Yuan Xue Institute for Software Integrated Systems - Vanderbilt University

Testbed platform

Single board computer **SBC 4495 from MicroSys**

Cyrix i486 compatible 64MB of RAM 14 bit A/D & D/A 24 I/O lines Ethernet adapter PCMCIA card slot External storage on hard drive or compact flash card

Operating System

GNU/Linux GRSecurity kernel patch No real-time extensions 8MB compact flash card



Possible Attack scenarios

Breaking data provider web application

Example web application written in PHP contains a bug which allows accessing restricted areas without authentication

Breaking data provider application

Example TCP/IP application contains a buffer overflow bug which exploited yields access to system



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- Gentoo 2005.1 with modified 2.4.32 kernel
- System with the DCControl application fits on

Changing behavior of the sensor component through control link

Gateway component allows authenticated users to change parameters of the sensor component.

Changing behavior of the sensor component through operating system layer

Running sensor component may be affected with modification of configuration files or through some operating systems mechanisms (signals, tracing)

operating system facilities

Security mechanisms and vulnerabilities

Hardware mechanisms

Processor rings

- Memory protection
- •Memory access bits
- •Partitioning

•Separate bus for code and data – Harvard Architecture

Vulnerabilities

- •Design flaws
- Race conditions
- •Buffer overflows
- Input validation errors
 - •Format strings
 - Code injection

Possible solutions

Introducing security on the design level

Avoiding design flaws and known bad programming habits using automated code generation

Enforcing security mechanisms on the operating system level and access control between applications



Partition A	Partition B	Partition A
Operating System		OS Services . K
Hardware		Ha

Software mechanisms

- Access control
- •Partitioning
- Capabilities
- Software based memory access bits

Exploiting embedded systems

Embedded systems aren't harder to exploit than multipurpose OS's

Useful shellcode doesn't have to yield shell access

Security by obscurity doesn't work out







