

An Empirical Study of

Vulnerability

Rewards Programs

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security
development
lifecycle

A vulnerability remediation strategy is any systematic approach whose goal is to reduce the number of software vulnerabilities.

CERT

Incident
Response

Operational
Security

D

Code Reviews

Penetration Testing

Dynamic/Static Analysis Tools

Bug Bounties?




WHAT IS A BUG BOUNTY?



WE PAY PEOPLE FOR PWINING US






There is an active debate over the value and effectiveness of VRPs. A number of vendors, notably Microsoft, Adobe, and Oracle, do not maintain a VRP, with Microsoft arguing that VRPs do not represent the best return on investment on a per-bug basis

-- Our paper

IE11 Preview Bug Bounty


Payouts & Tiers

| Vulnerability Type | Crash dump | Proof of concept | Functioning exploit | Whitepaper | Sandbox escape | Base Payout Tier |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------------------------|------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------|
| RCE vulnerability | not required | required | required | required | required | Tier 0 Could exceed \$11,000 USD* |
| | not required | required | required | required | not required | |
| | not required | required | required | optional | | Tier 1 maximum payment \$11,000 USD |
| | not required | required | n/a | | | |
| Important or higher severity design-level vulnerability | not required | required | Proof of Concept is sufficient | | | Tier 2 minimum payment \$1,100 USD* |
| Security bug with Privacy Implications | not required | required | not required | | | |
| Sandbox Escape Vulnerability | not required | required | optional | | | Tier 3 maximum payment 500 USD* |
| ASLR Info Disclosure Vulnerability | not required | required | n/a | | | |




* Higher payouts possible at Microsoft's discretion based on level of quality and complexity.

There is an active debate over the value and effectiveness of VRPs. A number of vendors, notably ~~Microsoft~~, Adobe, and Oracle, do not maintain a VRP, ~~with Microsoft arguing that VRPs do not represent the best investment on a per-bug~~



- Analysis of Chrome & Firefox VRPs
 - From 2 viewpoints
 - Software Vendor
 - Security Researchers
 - Other analysis of the data
 - Lots of hypotheses
 - We can't do experiments!
- today**

GRAPHS



GRAPHS EVERYWHERE

Chrome VRP

- Started in Jan 2010
- Rewards ranging from \$500 to \$1337
- Amounts increased over time to \$1000--\$3133.7
 - \$31,336 for exceptional reports with patches



Firefox VRP

- Started in 1995 by Netscape
- Rewards increased to \$3000 on July 1, 2010
- **All high/critical vulns get \$3000!**



data

Severity, reporter,
report date


VRP A ID affecting
stable releases

For VRP bugs,
reward amount
(always \$3K for
Firefox)

using
the VRP

For stable bugs,
date a patched
version available
to end-users

stable
releases



Severity

- An ordinal measure of “badness” of a security bug
- Arbitrary code execution with user’s privilege on the OS considered critical severity by both browsers
 - Chrome has a privilege separated design and a memory corruption vulnerability in the “renderer” process is only high severity (same origin bypass)
 - Nearly all memory corruption vulnerabilities in Firefox are critical severity

| Severity | Chrome Stable | Chrome Bounty | Firefox Stable | Firefox Bounty |
|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Low | 226 | 1 | 16 | 1 |
| Medium | 288 | 72 | 66 | 9 |
| High | 793 | 395 | 79 | 38 |
| Critical | 32 | 20 | 393 | 142 |
| Unknown | 8 | 13 | 59 | 0 |
| Total | 1347 | 501 | 613 | 190 |

**software vendor
perspective**

1

Finding Bugs

Bugs found

- 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions.
 - **Effective!**
- Note that we are only looking at bugs affecting release versions!
 - 140 high/crit Jan-May '13 in Chrome, only 40 found by VRP

Bugs found

- 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions.
 - **Effective!**

Bugs found

- 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions.
 - Effective!
- **Total bugs found by Chrome VRP: 371**
 - Max found by best internal researcher: 263
- **148 found by Firefox VRP (vs 48 by best internal)**


Bugs found

- 27.5% of bugs affecting Chrome releases originate from VRP contributions (371 of 1347), and 24.1% of bugs affecting Firefox releases (148 of 613) result from VRP contributions.
 - Effective!
- But is it **cost-effective?**



Cost

2

Cost of VRP



Cost of VRP



Cost of VRP

- Chrome total cost: \$579,605 (\$485/day)
 - \$186,839 (32%) for non-release bugs
- Firefox total cost: \$570,000 (\$658/day)
 - \$126,000 (22%) for non-release bugs
- Roughly, \$190,000/year
 - Comparable to total cost of **ONE** security engineer
 - \$100,000 + 50% overhead = \$500/day
- But is it **cost-effective? YES**


3

**Community
Engagement**

Community Engagement

- Get more security bugs from the community

Community Engagement: Critical Bugs



internal (blue) vs external (red)

Community Engagement

- Get more security bugs from the community
 - VRP found more critical bugs in Chrome (release) than Internal researchers
 - For Firefox, internal researchers find the lion's share of critical vulnerabilities
 - Although, VRP impact is improving

Given enough eyeballs, all
bugs are shallow

Linus' Law

| # Bugs | Freq. |
|--------|-------|
| 1 | 45 |
| 3 | 2 |
| 4 | 1 |
| 6 | 1 |
| 10 | 1 |
| 12 | 2 |
| 13 | 3 |
| 16 | 1 |
| 17 | 1 |
| 22 | 1 |
| 24 | 1 |
| 27 | 1 |
| 35 | 1 |
| 48 | 1 |
| 92 | 1 |
| Total | 63 |

(a) Chrome

| # Bugs | Freq. |
|--------|-------|
| 1 | 46 |
| 2 | 9 |
| 3 | 4 |
| 5 | 1 |
| 6 | 1 |
| 9 | 1 |
| 10 | 1 |
| 12 | 1 |
| 14 | 1 |
| 47 | 1 |
| Total | 66 |

(b) Firefox

45/46
people only
reported 1
high/critical
bug





Dino A. Dai Zovi

@dinodaizovi



Linus' Law ("given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow") is oblivious of Bystander Effect. Everyone assumes someone else audited the code.



Reply



Retweeted



Favorite



More

136

RETWEETS

45

FAVORITES



Maybe if we offer money?

Community Engagement

- Get more security bugs from the community
- Get more eyeballs on code
- Get more diverse bugs from the community
 - Chrome awards amounts ending with 337 for particularly smart/novel vulnerabilities
 - 31 such awards in our dataset
- Anecdotal evidence that it can lead to more bugs!
 - PinkiePie's exploit => full review of kernel API
 - a large number of similar issues found

**software vendor
perspective**

From the Software Vendor's view

- Effective: ~25% of bugs affecting release
- Cost effective: comparable to ONE developer
- Community Engagement
 - More bugs from community
 - More eyeballs
 - Diverse bugs leading to finding more issues

**security researcher
perspective**

**Reward
Amount**

1

Chrome Reward Amounts

| Amount (\$) | Frequency (%) |
|-------------|---------------|
| 500 | 24.75 |
| 1,000 | 60.08 |
| 1,337 | 3.59 |
| 1,500 | 2.99 |
| 2,000 | 2.99 |
| 2,337 | 0.60 |
| 2,500 | 0.60 |
| 3,000 | 0.20 |
| 3,133 | 1.80 |
| 3,500 | 0.20 |
| 4,000 | 0.20 |
| 4,500 | 0.20 |
| 5,000 | 0.20 |
| 7,331 | 0.20 |
| 10,000 | 1.40 |

95.8% of awards \leq \$3000 (Firefox)



Reward Amounts

- Vast majority of rewards for Chrome under \$1000 (median: \$1000, mean \$1156.9)
- Firefox award is \$3000 (high/critical) or \$0
- Lottery?
 - Low (or possibly negative) expected return on investment of finding bugs
 - But possibility of very large rewards!

2

**Repeat
Participation**

First time vs. Repeat Contribution



First-time (blue) vs repeat (red)

3

**VRP as
Employment**

Total Income

| \$ earned | Freq. |
|-----------|-------|
| 500 | 26 |
| 1,000 | 25 |
| 1,337 | 6 |
| 1,500 | 2 |
| 2,000 | 1 |
| 3,000 | 2 |
| 3,133 | 1 |
| 3,500 | 2 |
| 4,000 | 1 |
| 5,000 | 1 |
| 7,500 | 1 |
| 11,000 | 1 |
| 11,500 | 1 |
| 11,837 | 1 |
| 15,000 | 1 |
| 17,133 | 1 |
| 18,337 | 1 |
| 20,633 | 1 |
| 24,133 | 1 |
| 28,500 | 1 |
| 28,633 | 1 |
| 37,470 | 1 |
| 80,679 | 1 |
| 85,992 | 1 |
| 105,103 | 1 |
| Total | 82 |

(a) Chrome

| \$ earned | Freq. |
|-----------|-------|
| 3,000 | 46 |
| 6,000 | 12 |
| 9,000 | 4 |
| 12,000 | 1 |
| 15,000 | 1 |
| 21,000 | 1 |
| 27,000 | 1 |
| 30,000 | 1 |
| 36,000 | 1 |
| 42,000 | 1 |
| 141,000 | 1 |
| Total | 70 |

(b) Firefox

VRP as Employment

- The very best earn at the most \$47,000 per year
 - Such a person likely to make much more working for Firefox and Chrome
- Both Google and Mozilla hired researchers found via VRPs
 - Hypothesis: The best security researchers bubble to the top, where a full-time job awaits.

**security researcher
perspective**

From the Researcher's view

- Participation in a single VRP program likely not comparable to full-time employment
 - Although, good performance might lead to a job
 - Multiple programs could provide significant income
- Repeat participation is increasing
 - Suggests that researchers have a good experience with the programs
- Expected reward in Firefox higher than in Chrome
 - Although, possibility of much higher payoff in Chrome


other analysis

Severity


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Fraction of Vulns by Severity



(a) Chrome



(b) Firefox


Hypothesis: This difference is due to privilege separation

2


Time to Patch

| Severity | Median, Chrome | Std. dev. Chrome | Median, Firefox | Std. dev., Firefox |
|----------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Low | 58.5 | 110.6 | 114 | 256.1 |
| Severity | Median, Chrome | Std. dev. Chrome | Median, Firefox | Std. dev., Firefox |
| Critical | 20.0 | 26.6 | 76 | 116.5 |

Table 6: Median and standard deviation of number of days between vulnerability report and release that patches the vulnerability, for each severity level.



(a) Chrome



(b) Firefox

| Severity | Median, Chrome | Std. dev. Chrome | Median, Firefox | Std. dev., Firefox |
|----------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Low | 58.5 | 110.6 | 114 | 256.1 |
| Medium | 45.5 | 78.9 | 106 | 157.6 |
| High | 28.0 | 35.3 | 62.5 | 85.7 |
| Critical | 20.0 | 26.6 | 76 | 116.5 |

**Hypothesis: This difference is due to
privilege separation**

final thoughts



Firefox vs Chrome

- Despite costing roughly the same, the Chrome VRP
 - Identified 3x bugs
 - More popular
 - Similar participation between repeat and first-time
 - External Researchers competitive with Internal researchers (for bugs in release versions)
- Why?

Possible Reasons

- Tiered Reward Structure
 - Incentivizes participation, keeps cost low
- Low variance/mean time to patch
 - Researchers like when bugs get patched quickly
- Higher Profile for Chrome
 - Pwnium, a high profile event
 - sudden top-ups for rewards
 - Such “gamification” leads to more participation

Recommendations for Vendors

- VRPs seem cost-effective strategy
- Try to reduce time-to-patch
- Consider tiered incentives like Chrome
- Architecture can have massive impact
 - See impact of privilege separation for Google Chrome

thanks

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