A Distributed Strategy for Electricity Distribution Network Control in the face of DER Compromises
Devendra Shelar, Jairo Giraldo, Saurabh Amin

Citation
Devendra Shelar, Jairo Giraldo, Saurabh Amin. "A Distributed Strategy for Electricity Distribution Network Control in the face of DER Compromises". IEEE CDC 2015, 2015.

Abstract
We focus on the question of distributed control of electricity distribution networks in the face of security attacks to Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). Our attack model includes strategic manipulation of DER set-points by an external hacker to induce a sudden compromise of a subset of DERs connected to the network. We approach the distributed control design problem in two stages. In the first stage, we model the attacker-defender interaction as a Stackelberg game. The attacker (leader) disconnects a subset of DERs by sending them wrong set-point signals. The distribution utility (follower) response includes Volt-VAR control of non-compromised DERs and load control. The objective of the attacker (resp. defender) is to maximize (resp. minimize) the weighted sum of the total cost due to loss of frequency regulation and the cost due to loss of voltage regulation. In the second stage, we propose a distributed control (defender response) strategy for each local controller such that, if sudden supply-demand mismatch is detected (for example, due to DER compromises), the local controllers automatically respond based on their respective observations of local fluctuations in voltage and frequency. This strategy aims to achieve diversification of DER functions in the sense that each uncompromised DER node either contributes to voltage regulation (by contributing reactive power) or to frequency regulation (by contributing active power). We illustrate the effectiveness of this control strategy on a benchmark network.

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Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Devendra Shelar, Jairo Giraldo, Saurabh Amin. <a
    href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/135.html"
    >A Distributed Strategy for Electricity Distribution
    Network Control in the face of DER Compromises</a>,
    IEEE CDC 2015, 2015.
  • Plain text
    Devendra Shelar, Jairo Giraldo, Saurabh Amin. "A
    Distributed Strategy for Electricity Distribution Network
    Control in the face of DER Compromises". IEEE CDC 2015,
    2015.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{ShelarGiraldoAmin15_DistributedStrategyForElectricityDistributionNetwork,
        author = {Devendra Shelar and Jairo Giraldo and Saurabh Amin},
        title = {A Distributed Strategy for Electricity
                  Distribution Network Control in the face of DER
                  Compromises},
        booktitle = {IEEE CDC 2015},
        year = {2015},
        abstract = {We focus on the question of distributed control of
                  electricity distribution networks in the face of
                  security attacks to Distributed Energy Resources
                  (DERs). Our attack model includes strategic
                  manipulation of DER set-points by an external
                  hacker to induce a sudden compromise of a subset
                  of DERs connected to the network. We approach the
                  distributed control design problem in two stages.
                  In the first stage, we model the attacker-defender
                  interaction as a Stackelberg game. The attacker
                  (leader) disconnects a subset of DERs by sending
                  them wrong set-point signals. The distribution
                  utility (follower) response includes Volt-VAR
                  control of non-compromised DERs and load control.
                  The objective of the attacker (resp. defender) is
                  to maximize (resp. minimize) the weighted sum of
                  the total cost due to loss of frequency regulation
                  and the cost due to loss of voltage regulation. In
                  the second stage, we propose a distributed control
                  (defender response) strategy for each local
                  controller such that, if sudden supply-demand
                  mismatch is detected (for example, due to DER
                  compromises), the local controllers automatically
                  respond based on their respective observations of
                  local fluctuations in voltage and frequency. This
                  strategy aims to achieve diversification of DER
                  functions in the sense that each uncompromised DER
                  node either contributes to voltage regulation (by
                  contributing reactive power) or to frequency
                  regulation (by contributing active power). We
                  illustrate the effectiveness of this control
                  strategy on a benchmark network.},
        URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/135.html}
    }
    

Posted by Saurabh Amin on 15 Apr 2016.
Groups: forces
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