An Efficient Game for Coordinating Electric Vehicle Charging
Suli Zou, Zhongjing Ma, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens

Citation
Suli Zou, Zhongjing Ma, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens. "An Efficient Game for Coordinating Electric Vehicle Charging". IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2017.

Abstract
A novel class of auction-based games is formulated to study coordination problems arising from charging a population of electric vehicles (EVs) over a finite horizon. To compete for energy allocation over the horizon, each individual EV submits a multidimensional bid, with the dimension equal to two times the number of time-steps in the horizon. Use of the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism ensures that incentive compatibility holds for the auction games. However, due to the cross elasticity of EVs over the charging horizon, the marginal valuation of an individual EV at a particular time is determined by both the demand at that time and the total demand over the entire horizon. This difficulty is addressed by partitioning the allowable set of bid profiles based on the total desired energy over the entire horizon. It is shown that the efficient bid profile over the charging horizon is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying auction game. An update mechanism for the auction game is designed. A numerical example demonstrates that the auction process converges to an efficient Nash equilibrium. The auction-based charging coordination scheme is adapted to a receding horizon formulation to account for disturbances and forecast uncertainty.

Electronic downloads

Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Suli Zou, Zhongjing Ma, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens. <a
    href="http://www.cps-forces.org/pubs/222.html"
    >An Efficient Game for Coordinating Electric Vehicle
    Charging</a>, <i>IEEE Transactions on Automatic
    Control</i>,  2017.
  • Plain text
    Suli Zou, Zhongjing Ma, Xiangdong Liu, Ian Hiskens. "An
    Efficient Game for Coordinating Electric Vehicle
    Charging". <i>IEEE Transactions on Automatic
    Control</i>,  2017.
  • BibTeX
    @article{ZouMaLiuHiskens17_EfficientGameForCoordinatingElectricVehicleCharging,
        author = {Suli Zou and Zhongjing Ma and Xiangdong Liu and
                  Ian Hiskens},
        title = {An Efficient Game for Coordinating Electric
                  Vehicle Charging},
        journal = {IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
        year = {2017},
        abstract = {A novel class of auction-based games is formulated
                  to study coordination problems arising from
                  charging a population of electric vehicles (EVs)
                  over a finite horizon. To compete for energy
                  allocation over the horizon, each individual EV
                  submits a multidimensional bid, with the dimension
                  equal to two times the number of time-steps in the
                  horizon. Use of the progressive second price (PSP)
                  auction mechanism ensures that incentive
                  compatibility holds for the auction games.
                  However, due to the cross elasticity of EVs over
                  the charging horizon, the marginal valuation of an
                  individual EV at a particular time is determined
                  by both the demand at that time and the total
                  demand over the entire horizon. This difficulty is
                  addressed by partitioning the allowable set of bid
                  profiles based on the total desired energy over
                  the entire horizon. It is shown that the efficient
                  bid profile over the charging horizon is a Nash
                  equilibrium of the underlying auction game. An
                  update mechanism for the auction game is designed.
                  A numerical example demonstrates that the auction
                  process converges to an efficient Nash
                  equilibrium. The auction-based charging
                  coordination scheme is adapted to a receding
                  horizon formulation to account for disturbances
                  and forecast uncertainty.},
        URL = {http://cps-forces.org/pubs/222.html}
    }
    

Posted by Ian Hiskens on 28 Feb 2017.
For additional information, see the Publications FAQ or contact webmaster at cps-forces org.

Notice: This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright.