Citation
Miroslav Pajic, James Weimer, Paulo Tabuada, Nicola Bezzo, Oleg Sokolsky, Insup Lee, George Pappas. "Robustness of Attack-resilient State Estimators". International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ACM/IEEE ICCPS), ACM/ IEEE, 14, April, 2013; To be presented at the ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ACM/IEEE ICCPS), 2014.

Abstract
Until recently, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have not been built with security in mind. However, the in- teraction between information technology and physical world have made CPS vulnerable to malicious attacks beyond the standard cyber attacks. This has motivated the need for attack-resilient state estimation. Yet, the existing state-estimators are based on nonrealistic as- sumptions that the exact model of the system is known. Consequently, in this work we present a method for state estimation in presence of attacks, for systems with noise and modeling errors. We show that the attacker cannot destabilize the system by exploiting the difference be- tween the model used for the state estimation and the real physical dynamics of the system. Furthermore, we describe how implementation issues such as jitter, la- tency and synchronization errors can be mapped into parameters of the state estimation procedure that de- scribe modeling errors, and provide a bound on the state-estimation error caused by modeling errors. This enables mapping control performance requirements into real-time (i.e., timing related) specifications imposed on the underlying platform. Finally, we illustrate and ex- perimentally evaluate this approach on an unmanned ground vehicle case-study.

Electronic downloads

• http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/771/

• HTML

  Miroslav Pajic, James Weimer, Paulo Tabuada, Nicola Bezzo,
  Oleg Sokolsky, Insup Lee, George Pappas. <a
  href="http://www.terraswarm.org/pubs/223.html">Robustness
  of Attack-resilient State Estimators</a>,
  International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ACM/IEEE
  ICCPS), ACM/ IEEE, 14, April, 2013; To be presented at the
  <A href="http://iccps.acm.org/2014/"
  >ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical
  Systems (ACM/IEEE ICCPS), 2014</A>.

• Plain text

  Miroslav Pajic, James Weimer, Paulo Tabuada, Nicola Bezzo,
  Oleg Sokolsky, Insup Lee, George Pappas. "Robustness of
  Attack-resilient State Estimators". International
  Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ACM/IEEE ICCPS), ACM/
  IEEE, 14, April, 2013; To be presented at the <A
  href="http://iccps.acm.org/2014/">ACM/IEEE
  International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ACM/IEEE
  ICCPS), 2014</A>.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{PajicWeimerTabuadaBezzoSokolskyLeePappas13_RobustnessOfAttackresilientStateEstimators,
      author = {Miroslav Pajic and James Weimer and Paulo Tabuada
                and Nicola Bezzo and Oleg Sokolsky and Insup Lee
                and George Pappas},
      title = {Robustness of Attack-resilient State Estimators},
      booktitle = {International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
                (ACM/IEEE ICCPS)},
      organization = {ACM/ IEEE},
      day = {14},
      month = {April},
      year = {2013},
      note = {To be presented at the <A
                href="http://iccps.acm.org/2014/">ACM/IEEE
                International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
                (ACM/IEEE ICCPS), 2014</A>.},
      abstract = {Until recently, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have
                not been built with security in mind. However, the
                in- teraction between information technology and
                physical world have made CPS vulnerable to
                malicious attacks beyond the standard cyber
                attacks. This has motivated the need for
                attack-resilient state estimation. Yet, the
                existing state-estimators are based on
                nonrealistic as- sumptions that the exact model of
                the system is known. Consequently, in this work we
                present a method for state estimation in presence
                of attacks, for systems with noise and modeling
                errors. We show that the attacker cannot
                destabilize the system by exploiting the
                difference be- tween the model used for the state
                estimation and the real physical dynamics of the
                system. Furthermore, we describe how
                implementation issues such as jitter, la- tency
                and synchronization errors can be mapped into
                parameters of the state estimation procedure that
                de- scribe modeling errors, and provide a bound on
                the state-estimation error caused by modeling
                errors. This enables mapping control performance
                requirements into real-time (i.e., timing related)
                specifications imposed on the underlying platform.
                Finally, we illustrate and ex- perimentally
                evaluate this approach on an unmanned ground
                vehicle case-study.},
      URL = {http://terraswarm.org/pubs/223.html}
  }
  

Posted by Barb Hoversten on 25 Nov 2013.