Model-Based Evaluation of GPS Spoofing Attacks
Ilge Akkaya, Edward A. Lee, Patricia Derler

Citation
Ilge Akkaya, Edward A. Lee, Patricia Derler. "Model-Based Evaluation of GPS Spoofing Attacks". Talk or presentation, 14, February, 2013; Presented at BEARS 2013, Berkeley.

Abstract
Emerging cyber-physical system (CPS) applications require reliable time synchronization to enable distributed control and sensing applications. Sensor-rich distributed CPS such as the ”smart grid” highly rely on GPS for sub-station clock synchronization. The vulnerability of clock synchronization protocols to spoofing attacks is a potential risk factor that may lead to falsified sensor readings and, at a larger scale, may become hazardous for system safety. We introduce a simulationbased assessment of the effect of time accuracy on time-centric power system applications. In particular, we investigate the vulnerability of power grid sensors to erroneous time references and the potential risks of time spoofing on power grid health, using the Ptolemy modeling and simulation tool. As a case study, we consider two GPS spoofing scenarios, which may either trigger false generator trips or conceal existing phase angle deviations in the power grid to cause potential grid instability

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Citation formats

• HTML

  Ilge Akkaya, Edward A. Lee, Patricia Derler. <a
  href="http://www.terraswarm.org/pubs/39.html"
  ><i>Model-Based Evaluation of GPS Spoofing
  Attacks</i></a>, Talk or presentation,  14,
  February, 2013; Presented at BEARS 2013, Berkeley.

• Plain text

  Ilge Akkaya, Edward A. Lee, Patricia Derler.
  "Model-Based Evaluation of GPS Spoofing Attacks".
  Talk or presentation,  14, February, 2013; Presented at
  BEARS 2013, Berkeley.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{AkkayaLeeDerler13_ModelBasedEvaluationOfGPSSpoofingAttacks,
      author = {Ilge Akkaya and Edward A. Lee and Patricia Derler},
      title = {Model-Based Evaluation of GPS Spoofing Attacks},
      day = {14},
      month = {February},
      year = {2013},
      note = {Presented at BEARS 2013, Berkeley},
      abstract = {Emerging cyber-physical system (CPS) applications
                require reliable time synchronization to enable
                distributed control and sensing applications.
                Sensor-rich distributed CPS such as the �smart
                grid� highly rely on GPS for sub-station clock
                synchronization. The vulnerability of clock
                synchronization protocols to spoofing attacks is a
                potential risk factor that may lead to falsified
                sensor readings and, at a larger scale, may become
                hazardous for system safety. We introduce a
                simulationbased assessment of the effect of time
                accuracy on time-centric power system
                applications. In particular, we investigate the
                vulnerability of power grid sensors to erroneous
                time references and the potential risks of time
                spoofing on power grid health, using the Ptolemy
                modeling and simulation tool. As a case study, we
                consider two GPS spoofing scenarios, which may
                either trigger false generator trips or conceal
                existing phase angle deviations in the power grid
                to cause potential grid instability},
      URL = {http://terraswarm.org/pubs/39.html}
  }
  

Posted by Ilge Akkaya on 15 Feb 2013.