Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
Jonathan Traupman. "When a Good Reputation isn't Good Enough". Talk or presentation, 19, October, 2006.

Abstract
We propose a game theoretic model for the trading and feedback process in peer-to-peer marketplaces. Using this model, we construct an evolutionary marketplace simulator, which we use to investigate the effectiveness of reputation systems. Our experiments show that under the right circumstances, a reputation system is sufficient for encouraging cooperation among a pool of self-interested agents. However, we also show that features of existing reputation systems, namely allowing users to retaliate for negative feedback, drastically undermine reputation system effectiveness.

Electronic downloads

• evolution.ppt · application/vnd.ms-powerpoint · 2761 kbytes

• HTML

  Jonathan Traupman. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/133.html"
  ><i>When a Good Reputation isn't Good
  Enough</i></a>, Talk or presentation,  19,
  October, 2006.

• Plain text

  Jonathan Traupman. "When a Good Reputation isn't Good
  Enough". Talk or presentation,  19, October, 2006.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Traupman06_WhenGoodReputationIsntGoodEnough,
      author = {Jonathan Traupman},
      title = {When a Good Reputation isn't Good Enough},
      day = {19},
      month = {October},
      year = {2006},
      abstract = {We propose a game theoretic model for the trading
                and feedback process in peer-to-peer marketplaces.
                Using this model, we construct an evolutionary
                marketplace simulator, which we use to investigate
                the effectiveness of reputation systems. Our
                experiments show that under the right
                circumstances, a reputation system is sufficient
                for encouraging cooperation among a pool of
                self-interested agents. However, we also show that
                features of existing reputation systems, namely
                allowing users to retaliate for negative feedback,
                drastically undermine reputation system
                effectiveness.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/133.html}
  }
  

Posted by Alvaro Cardenas on 26 Oct 2006.
Groups: trustseminar
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