Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
J. M. McCune, B. Parno, A. Perrig, M. Reiter, A. Seshadri. "Minimal TCB code execution (Extended abstract)". Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May, 2007.

Abstract
We propose an architecture that allows code to execute in complete isolation from other software while trusting only a tiny software base that is orders of magnitude smaller than even minimalist virtual machine monitors. Our technique also enables more meaningful attestation than previous proposals, since only measurements of the security-sensitive portions of an application need to be included. We achieve these guarantees by leveraging hardware support provided by commodity processors from AMD and Intel that are shipping today.

Electronic downloads

• HTML

  J. M. McCune, B. Parno, A. Perrig, M. Reiter, A. Seshadri.
  <a href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/192.html"
  >Minimal TCB code execution (Extended
  abstract)</a>, Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium
  on Security and Privacy, May, 2007.

• Plain text

  J. M. McCune, B. Parno, A. Perrig, M. Reiter, A. Seshadri.
  "Minimal TCB code execution (Extended abstract)".
  Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and
  Privacy, May, 2007.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{McCuneParnoPerrigReiterSeshadri07_MinimalTCBCodeExecutionExtendedAbstract,
      author = {J. M. McCune and B. Parno and A. Perrig and M.
                Reiter and A. Seshadri},
      title = {Minimal TCB code execution (Extended abstract)},
      booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security
                and Privacy},
      month = {May},
      year = {2007},
      abstract = {We propose an architecture that allows code to
                execute in complete isolation from other software
                while trusting only a tiny software base that is
                orders of magnitude smaller than even minimalist
                virtual machine monitors. Our technique also
                enables more meaningful attestation than previous
                proposals, since only measurements of the
                security-sensitive portions of an application need
                to be included. We achieve these guarantees by
                leveraging hardware support provided by commodity
                processors from AMD and Intel that are shipping
                today.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/192.html}
  }
  

Posted by Michael Reiter on 10 Mar 2007.
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