Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
"• SANE: A protection architecture for enterprise networks.". M. Casado, Tal Garfinkel, A. Akella, M. Freedman, D. Boneh, N. McKeown, and S. Shenker (eds.), Usenix Security, 2006.

Abstract
Connectivity in today's enterprise networks is regulated by a combination of complex routing and bridging policies, along with various interdiction mechanisms such as ACLs, packet filters, and other middleboxes that attempt to retrofit access control onto an otherwise permissive network architecture. This leads to enterprise networks that are inflexible, fragile, and difficult to manage. To address these limitations, we offer SANE, a protection architecture for enterprise networks. SANE defines a single protection layer that governs all connectivity within the enterprise. All routing and access control decisions are made by a logically-centralized server that grants access to services by handing out capabilities (encrypted source routes) according to declarative access control policies (e.g., "Alice can access http server foo"). Capabilities are enforced at each switch, which are simple and only minimally trusted. SANE offers strong attack resistance and containment in the face of compromise, yet is practical for everyday use. Our prototype implementation shows that SANE could be deployed in current networks with only a few modifications, and it can easily scale to networks of tens of thousands of nodes.

Electronic downloads

• http://yuba.stanford.edu/~casado/sane.pdf

• HTML

   <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/597.html"
  ><i>•	SANE: A protection architecture
  for enterprise networks.</i></a>, M. Casado, Tal
  Garfinkel, A. Akella, M. Freedman, D. Boneh, N. McKeown, and
  S. Shenker (eds.), Usenix Security, 2006.

• Plain text

   "•	SANE: A protection architecture for
  enterprise networks.". M. Casado, Tal Garfinkel, A.
  Akella, M. Freedman, D. Boneh, N. McKeown, and S. Shenker
  (eds.), Usenix Security, 2006.

• BibTeX

  @proceedings{CasadoGarfinkelAkellaFreedmanBonehMcKeownShenker06_SANEProtectionArchitectureForEnterpriseNetworks,
      title = {•	SANE: A protection architecture for enterprise
                networks.},
      editor = {M. Casado, Tal Garfinkel, A. Akella, M. Freedman,
                D. Boneh, N. McKeown, and S. Shenker},
      organization = {Usenix Security},
      year = {2006},
      abstract = {Connectivity in today's enterprise networks is
                regulated by a combination of complex routing and
                bridging policies, along with various interdiction
                mechanisms such as ACLs, packet filters, and other
                middleboxes that attempt to retrofit access
                control onto an otherwise permissive network
                architecture. This leads to enterprise networks
                that are inflexible, fragile, and difficult to
                manage. To address these limitations, we offer
                SANE, a protection architecture for enterprise
                networks. SANE defines a single protection layer
                that governs all connectivity within the
                enterprise. All routing and access control
                decisions are made by a logically-centralized
                server that grants access to services by handing
                out capabilities (encrypted source routes)
                according to declarative access control policies
                (e.g., "Alice can access http server foo").
                Capabilities are enforced at each switch, which
                are simple and only minimally trusted. SANE offers
                strong attack resistance and containment in the
                face of compromise, yet is practical for everyday
                use. Our prototype implementation shows that SANE
                could be deployed in current networks with only a
                few modifications, and it can easily scale to
                networks of tens of thousands of nodes. },
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/597.html}
  }
  

Posted by Jessica Gamble on 16 Mar 2009.
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