Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
"Protecting Browser State from Web Privacy Attacks". C. Jackson, A. Bortz, D. Boneh, and J. Mitchell (eds.), 15th International Conference on World Wide Web, 2006.

Abstract
Through a variety of means, including a range of browser cache methods and inspecting the color of a visited hyper-link, client-side browser state can be exploited to track users against their wishes. This tracking is possible because per- sistent, client-side browser state is not properly partitioned on per-site basis in current browsers. We address this problem by refining the general notion of a same-origin policy and implementing two browser extensions that enforce this policy on the browser cache and visited links. We also analyze various degrees of cooperation between sites to track users, and show that even if long-term browser state is properly partitioned, it is still possible for sites to use modern web features to bounce users between sites and invisibly engage in cross-domain tracking of their visitors. Cooperative privacy attacks are an unavoidable consequence of all persistent browser state that affects the behavior of the browser, and disabling or frequently expiring this state is the only way to achieve true privacy against colluding parties.

Electronic downloads

• http://crypto.stanford.edu/sameorigin/

• HTML

   <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/599.html"
  ><i>Protecting Browser State from Web Privacy
  Attacks</i></a>,  C. Jackson, A. Bortz, D.
  Boneh, and J. Mitchell (eds.), 15th International Conference
  on World Wide Web, 2006.

• Plain text

   "Protecting Browser State from Web Privacy
  Attacks".  C. Jackson, A. Bortz, D. Boneh, and J.
  Mitchell (eds.), 15th International Conference on World Wide
  Web, 2006.

• BibTeX

  @proceedings{JacksonBortzBonehMitchell06_ProtectingBrowserStateFromWebPrivacyAttacks,
      title = {Protecting Browser State from Web Privacy Attacks},
      editor = { C. Jackson, A. Bortz, D. Boneh, and J. Mitchell},
      organization = {15th International Conference on World Wide Web},
      year = {2006},
      abstract = {Through a variety of means, including a range of
                browser cache methods and inspecting the color of
                a visited hyper-link, client-side browser state
                can be exploited to track users against their
                wishes. This tracking is possible because per-
                sistent, client-side browser state is not properly
                partitioned on per-site basis in current browsers.
                We address this problem by refining the general
                notion of a same-origin policy and implementing
                two browser extensions that enforce this policy on
                the browser cache and visited links. We also
                analyze various degrees of cooperation between
                sites to track users, and show that even if
                long-term browser state is properly partitioned,
                it is still possible for sites to use modern web
                features to bounce users between sites and
                invisibly engage in cross-domain tracking of their
                visitors. Cooperative privacy attacks are an
                unavoidable consequence of all persistent browser
                state that affects the behavior of the browser,
                and disabling or frequently expiring this state is
                the only way to achieve true privacy against
                colluding parties. },
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/599.html}
  }
  

Posted by Jessica Gamble on 16 Mar 2009.
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