Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
Arnab Roy. "Reasoning about Concrete Security in Protocol Proofs". Talk or presentation, 30, November, 2009.

Abstract
Concrete security analysis of network protocols is a refinement of complexity theoretic analysis where the aim is to provide quantitative security guarantees instead of asymptotic ones. This provides valuable insight into answering such questions as how frequently should we refresh keys and what is the exact trade-off between security and efficiency given known methods to attack the cryptographic primitives. We are developing a logical framework which supports reasoning about concrete security. We demonstrate the system by proving concrete authentication guarantee of a signature based challenge response protocol. This is joint work with Anupam Datta, Joseph Y. Halpern, John C. Mitchell, and Riccardo Pucella.

Electronic downloads

• 14%20-%20Roy.ppt · application/vnd.ms-powerpoint · 916 kbytes

• HTML

  Arnab Roy. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/644.html"
  ><i>Reasoning about Concrete Security in Protocol
  Proofs</i></a>, Talk or presentation,  30,
  November, 2009.

• Plain text

  Arnab Roy. "Reasoning about Concrete Security in
  Protocol Proofs". Talk or presentation,  30, November,
  2009.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Roy09_ReasoningAboutConcreteSecurityInProtocolProofs,
      author = {Arnab Roy},
      title = {Reasoning about Concrete Security in Protocol
                Proofs},
      day = {30},
      month = {November},
      year = {2009},
      abstract = {Concrete security analysis of network protocols is
                a refinement of complexity theoretic analysis
                where the aim is to provide quantitative security
                guarantees instead of asymptotic ones. This
                provides valuable insight into answering such
                questions as how frequently should we refresh keys
                and what is the exact trade-off between security
                and efficiency given known methods to attack the
                cryptographic primitives. We are developing a
                logical framework which supports reasoning about
                concrete security. We demonstrate the system by
                proving concrete authentication guarantee of a
                signature based challenge response protocol. This
                is joint work with Anupam Datta, Joseph Y.
                Halpern, John C. Mitchell, and Riccardo Pucella.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/644.html}
  }
  

Posted by Larry Rohrbough on 5 Nov 2009.
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