Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Congestion Pricing Using a Raffle-Based Scheme
Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musacchio, Saurabh Amin, Shankar Sastry

Citation
Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musacchio, Saurabh Amin, Shankar Sastry. "Congestion Pricing Using a Raffle-Based Scheme". Network Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP), 5th International Conference, IEEE, 1-8, 12, October, 2011.

Abstract
We propose a raffle-based scheme for the decongestion of a shared resource. Our scheme builds on ideas from the economic literature on incentivizing contributions to a public good. We formulate a game-theoretic model for the decongestion problem in a setup with a finite number of users, as well as in a setup with an infinite number of non-atomic users. We analyze both setups, and show that the former converges toward the latter when the number of users becomes large. We compare our results to existing results for the public good provision problem. Overall, our results establish that raffle-based schemes are useful in addressing congestion problems.

Electronic downloads

Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musacchio, Saurabh
    Amin, Shankar Sastry. <a
    href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/823.html"
    >Congestion Pricing Using a Raffle-Based
    Scheme</a>, Network Games, Control and Optimization
    (NetGCooP), 5th International Conference, IEEE, 1-8, 12,
    October, 2011.
  • Plain text
    Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musacchio, Saurabh
    Amin, Shankar Sastry. "Congestion Pricing Using a
    Raffle-Based Scheme". Network Games, Control and
    Optimization (NetGCooP), 5th International Conference, IEEE,
    1-8, 12, October, 2011.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{LoiseauSchwartzMusacchioAminSastry11_CongestionPricingUsingRaffleBasedScheme,
        author = {Patrick Loiseau and Galina A. Schwartz and John
                  Musacchio and Saurabh Amin and Shankar Sastry},
        title = {Congestion Pricing Using a Raffle-Based Scheme},
        booktitle = {Network Games, Control and Optimization
                  (NetGCooP), 5th International Conference},
        organization = {IEEE},
        pages = {1-8},
        day = {12},
        month = {October},
        year = {2011},
        abstract = {We propose a raffle-based scheme for the
                  decongestion of a shared resource. Our scheme
                  builds on ideas from the economic literature on
                  incentivizing contributions to a public good. We
                  formulate a game-theoretic model for the
                  decongestion problem in a setup with a finite
                  number of users, as well as in a setup with an
                  infinite number of non-atomic users. We analyze
                  both setups, and show that the former converges
                  toward the latter when the number of users becomes
                  large. We compare our results to existing results
                  for the public good provision problem. Overall,
                  our results establish that raffle-based schemes
                  are useful in addressing congestion problems.},
        URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/823.html}
    }
    

Posted by Mary Stewart on 3 Apr 2012.
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