Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh Amin. "Incentive schemes for internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing". 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing, IEEE, 103-110, 28, September, 2011.

Abstract
The Internet is plagued with congestion problems of growing severity which are worst at peak periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes that incentivize users to shift part of their usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a fixed reward per unit of shifted usage. Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a random reward distributed in proportion of each user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the users' utilities.

Electronic downloads

• http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6120156&tag=1

• HTML

  Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh
  Amin. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/824.html"
  >Incentive schemes for internet congestion management:
  Raffles versus time-of-day pricing</a>, 49th Annual
  Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing,
  IEEE, 103-110, 28, September, 2011.

• Plain text

  Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh
  Amin. "Incentive schemes for internet congestion
  management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing". 49th
  Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and
  Computing, IEEE, 103-110, 28, September, 2011.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{LoiseauSchwartzMusachhioAmin11_IncentiveSchemesForInternetCongestionManagementRaffles,
      author = {Patrick Loiseau and Galina A. Schwartz and John
                Musachhio and Saurabh Amin},
      title = {Incentive schemes for internet congestion
                management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing},
      booktitle = {49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
                Control and Computing},
      organization = {IEEE},
      pages = {103-110},
      day = {28},
      month = {September},
      year = {2011},
      abstract = {The Internet is plagued with congestion problems
                of growing severity which are worst at peak
                periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes
                that incentivize users to shift part of their
                usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The
                traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a
                fixed reward per unit of shifted usage.
                Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a
                random reward distributed in proportion of each
                user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using
                a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes
                can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a
                unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison
                of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the
                users' utilities.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/824.html}
  }
  

Posted by Mary Stewart on 3 Apr 2012.
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