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Incentive schemes for internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing
Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh Amin

Citation
Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh Amin. "Incentive schemes for internet congestion management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing". 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing, IEEE, 103-110, 28, September, 2011.

Abstract
The Internet is plagued with congestion problems of growing severity which are worst at peak periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes that incentivize users to shift part of their usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a fixed reward per unit of shifted usage. Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a random reward distributed in proportion of each user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the users' utilities.

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Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh
    Amin. <a
    href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/824.html"
    >Incentive schemes for internet congestion management:
    Raffles versus time-of-day pricing</a>, 49th Annual
    Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing,
    IEEE, 103-110, 28, September, 2011.
  • Plain text
    Patrick Loiseau, Galina A. Schwartz, John Musachhio, Saurabh
    Amin. "Incentive schemes for internet congestion
    management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing". 49th
    Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and
    Computing, IEEE, 103-110, 28, September, 2011.
  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{LoiseauSchwartzMusachhioAmin11_IncentiveSchemesForInternetCongestionManagementRaffles,
        author = {Patrick Loiseau and Galina A. Schwartz and John
                  Musachhio and Saurabh Amin},
        title = {Incentive schemes for internet congestion
                  management: Raffles versus time-of-day pricing},
        booktitle = {49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
                  Control and Computing},
        organization = {IEEE},
        pages = {103-110},
        day = {28},
        month = {September},
        year = {2011},
        abstract = {The Internet is plagued with congestion problems
                  of growing severity which are worst at peak
                  periods. In this paper, we compare two schemes
                  that incentivize users to shift part of their
                  usage from the peak-time to the off-peak time. The
                  traditional time-of-day pricing scheme gives a
                  fixed reward per unit of shifted usage.
                  Conversely, the raffle-based scheme provides a
                  random reward distributed in proportion of each
                  user's fraction of the total shifted usage. Using
                  a game-theoretic model, we show that both schemes
                  can achieve an optimal level of decongestion at a
                  unique Nash equilibrium. We provide a comparison
                  of the schemes' sensitivity to uncertainty of the
                  users' utilities.},
        URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/824.html}
    }
    

Posted by Mary Stewart on 3 Apr 2012.
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