Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
G. A. Schwartz, S. Amin, A. Gueye, J. Walrand. "Network design game with both reliability and security failures". 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, IEEE, pp 675-681, 28, September, 2011.

Abstract
This paper investigates the connection between network reliability and security by modeling attacker-defender interactions as a game. We model the defender's network as an undirected graph with insecure and unreliable edges. The edges could either fail due to a random malfunction (fault), or due to a strategic attacker who aims to maximize the defender's loss (attack). In many environments, the defender faces prohibitive costs of isolating the type of failures, i.e., fault versus attack. In addition, delays in arrival of diagnostic information to the defender may prevent him to detect the type of failure. To account for such information deficiencies, we let the defender know only the relative frequencies of failures with different types. From our analysis, equilibrium depends on these relative frequencies, and on the exogenously given probability distribution of reliability failures on the edges. Thus, in presence of the aforementioned information deficiencies, reliability and security are interdependent, and we argue that defenders (managers) should co-design their defenses against faults and attacks.

Electronic downloads

• http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6120233

• HTML

  G. A. Schwartz, S. Amin, A. Gueye, J. Walrand. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/829.html"
  >Network design game with both reliability and security
  failures</a>, 49th Annual Allerton Conference on
  Communication, Control, and Computing, IEEE, pp 675-681, 28,
  September, 2011.

• Plain text

  G. A. Schwartz, S. Amin, A. Gueye, J. Walrand. "Network
  design game with both reliability and security
  failures". 49th Annual Allerton Conference on
  Communication, Control, and Computing, IEEE, pp 675-681, 28,
  September, 2011.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{SchwartzAminGueyeWalrand11_NetworkDesignGameWithBothReliabilitySecurityFailures,
      author = {G. A. Schwartz and S. Amin and A. Gueye and J.
                Walrand},
      title = {Network design game with both reliability and
                security failures},
      booktitle = {49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
                Control, and Computing},
      organization = {IEEE},
      pages = {pp 675-681},
      day = {28},
      month = {September},
      year = {2011},
      abstract = {This paper investigates the connection between
                network reliability and security by modeling
                attacker-defender interactions as a game. We model
                the defender's network as an undirected graph with
                insecure and unreliable edges. The edges could
                either fail due to a random malfunction (fault),
                or due to a strategic attacker who aims to
                maximize the defender's loss (attack). In many
                environments, the defender faces prohibitive costs
                of isolating the type of failures, i.e., fault
                versus attack. In addition, delays in arrival of
                diagnostic information to the defender may prevent
                him to detect the type of failure. To account for
                such information deficiencies, we let the defender
                know only the relative frequencies of failures
                with different types. From our analysis,
                equilibrium depends on these relative frequencies,
                and on the exogenously given probability
                distribution of reliability failures on the edges.
                Thus, in presence of the aforementioned
                information deficiencies, reliability and security
                are interdependent, and we argue that defenders
                (managers) should co-design their defenses against
                faults and attacks.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/829.html}
  }
  

Posted by Mary Stewart on 3 Apr 2012.
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