Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
Bruno Sinopoli. "Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA Systems". Talk or presentation, 10, October, 2013.

Abstract
Ensuring security of systems based on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a major challenge. The goal of this paper is to develop mode-based techniques capable of detecting integrity attacks on the sensor of a control system. In this paper the effect of integrity attacks on control systems I analyzed and countermeasure capable of exposing such attacks are proposed. The main contributions of the paper, beyond the novelty of the problem formulation, lies in enumerating the conditions of the feasibility of the replay attack, and suggesting countermeasures that optimize probability of detection by conceding control performance. The methodologies are illustrated and the theoretical results are validated using several sets of simulations.

Electronic downloads

• Sinopoli_Allerton2013_Sean2_2013_10_TRUST.pdf · application/pdf · 1283 kbytes

• HTML

  Bruno Sinopoli. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/929.html"
  ><i>Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA
  Systems</i></a>, Talk or presentation,  10,
  October, 2013.

• Plain text

  Bruno Sinopoli. "Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA
  Systems". Talk or presentation,  10, October, 2013.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Sinopoli13_DetectingIntegrityAttacksOnSCADASystems,
      author = {Bruno Sinopoli},
      title = {Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA Systems},
      day = {10},
      month = {October},
      year = {2013},
      abstract = {Ensuring security of systems based on supervisory
                control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a major
                challenge. The goal of this paper is to develop
                mode-based techniques capable of detecting
                integrity attacks on the sensor of a control
                system. In this paper the effect of integrity
                attacks on control systems I analyzed and
                countermeasure capable of exposing such attacks
                are proposed. The main contributions of the paper,
                beyond the novelty of the problem formulation,
                lies in enumerating the conditions of the
                feasibility of the replay attack, and suggesting
                countermeasures that optimize probability of
                detection by conceding control performance. The
                methodologies are illustrated and the theoretical
                results are validated using several sets of
                simulations.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/929.html}
  }
  

Posted by Carolyn Winter on 18 Nov 2013.
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