Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
Jens Grossklags, Benjamin Johnson, Nicolas Christin. "When Information Improves Information Security". Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC'10), January, 2010.

Abstract
This paper presents a formal, quantitative evaluation of the impact of bounded-rational security decision-making subject to limited information and externalities. We investigate a mixed economy of an individual rational expert and several naıve near-sighted agents. We further model three canonical types of negative externalities (weakest-link, best shot and total effort), and study the impact of two information regimes on the threat level agents are facing.

Electronic downloads

• paper.pdf · application/pdf · 372 kbytes

• HTML

  Jens Grossklags, Benjamin Johnson, Nicolas Christin. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/660.html"
  >When Information Improves Information
  Security</a>, Proceedings of the Fourteenth
  International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data
  Security (FC'10), January, 2010.

• Plain text

  Jens Grossklags, Benjamin Johnson, Nicolas Christin.
  "When Information Improves Information Security".
  Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on
  Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC'10), January,
  2010.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{GrossklagsJohnsonChristin10_WhenInformationImprovesInformationSecurity,
      author = {Jens Grossklags and Benjamin Johnson and Nicolas
                Christin},
      title = {When Information Improves Information Security},
      booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourteenth International
                Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data
                Security (FC'10)},
      month = {January},
      year = {2010},
      abstract = {This paper presents a formal, quantitative
                evaluation of the impact of bounded-rational
                security decision-making subject to limited
                information and externalities. We investigate a
                mixed economy of an individual rational expert and
                several naıve near-sighted agents. We further
                model three canonical types of negative
                externalities (weakest-link, best shot and total
                effort), and study the impact of two information
                regimes on the threat level agents are facing.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/660.html}
  }
  

Posted by Nicolas Christin on 28 Mar 2010.
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