Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Citation
Saurabh Amin. "Security Interdependencies for Networked Control Systems with Identical Agents". Talk or presentation, 10, November, 2010.

Abstract
This paper studies the security choices of identical plant- controller systems, when their security is interdependent due the exposure to network induced risks. Each plant is modeled by a discrete-time stochastic linear system, which is sensed and controlled over a communication network. We model security decisions of the individual systems (also called players) as a game. We consider a two-stage game, in which first, the players choose whether to invest in security or not; and thereafter, choose control inputs to minimize the average operational costs. We fully characterize equilibria of the game, which give us the individually optimal security choices. We also find the socially optimal choices. The presence of security interdependence creates a negative externality, and results in a gap between the individual and the socially optimal security choices for a wide range of security costs. Due to the negative externality, the individual players tend to under invest in security.

Electronic downloads

• 2%20-%20Amin%20%28Berkeley%29.pdf · application/nappdf · 1040 kbytes

• HTML

  Saurabh Amin. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/756.html"
  ><i>Security Interdependencies for Networked
  Control Systems with Identical Agents</i></a>,
  Talk or presentation,  10, November, 2010.

• Plain text

  Saurabh Amin. "Security Interdependencies for Networked
  Control Systems with Identical Agents". Talk or
  presentation,  10, November, 2010.

• BibTeX

  @presentation{Amin10_SecurityInterdependenciesForNetworkedControlSystemsWith,
      author = {Saurabh Amin},
      title = {Security Interdependencies for Networked Control
                Systems with Identical Agents},
      day = {10},
      month = {November},
      year = {2010},
      abstract = {This paper studies the security choices of
                identical plant- controller systems, when their
                security is interdependent due the exposure to
                network induced risks. Each plant is modeled by a
                discrete-time stochastic linear system, which is
                sensed and controlled over a communication
                network. We model security decisions of the
                individual systems (also called players) as a
                game. We consider a two-stage game, in which
                first, the players choose whether to invest in
                security or not; and thereafter, choose control
                inputs to minimize the average operational costs.
                We fully characterize equilibria of the game,
                which give us the individually optimal security
                choices. We also find the socially optimal
                choices. The presence of security interdependence
                creates a negative externality, and results in a
                gap between the individual and the socially
                optimal security choices for a wide range of
                security costs. Due to the negative externality,
                the individual players tend to under invest in
                security.},
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/756.html}
  }
  

Posted by Larry Rohrbough on 7 Dec 2010.
Groups: trust
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