Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

SessionJuggler: Secure Login From an Untrusted Terminal Using Session Hijacking
Elie Bursztein

Citation
Elie Bursztein. "SessionJuggler: Secure Login From an Untrusted Terminal Using Session Hijacking". Talk or presentation, 10, November, 2010.

Abstract
We show that session hijacking can have positive applications, in particular, it can help with secure login from an untrusted terminal. While there are many proposals for securing a login from an untrusted terminal, they all require either server-side changes or client-side changes. In this paper we explore a new web user authentication mechanism called SessionJuggler that enables user login without ever entering a long-term credential on the insecure terminal. SessionJuggler requires no server-side changes and assumes no special software on the client beyond a modern web browser. Roughly speaking, with SessionJuggler users log in to a web site using a modified smartphone browser and then transfer the entire session, including cookies and all other session state, to the terminal. The challenge is to ensure that this transfer—which looks like session hijacking—does not cause the web site to invalidate the session. We survey session hijacking defenses used by popular sites and explain how SessionJuggler bypasses all these defenses. Beyond session migration, SessionJuggler also provides a trusted logout mechanism where the trusted phone is used to terminate the session.

Electronic downloads

Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Elie Bursztein. <a
    href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/763.html"
    ><i>SessionJuggler: Secure Login From an Untrusted
    Terminal Using Session Hijacking</i></a>, Talk
    or presentation,  10, November, 2010.
  • Plain text
    Elie Bursztein. "SessionJuggler: Secure Login From an
    Untrusted Terminal Using Session Hijacking". Talk or
    presentation,  10, November, 2010.
  • BibTeX
    @presentation{Bursztein10_SessionJugglerSecureLoginFromUntrustedTerminalUsing,
        author = {Elie Bursztein},
        title = {SessionJuggler: Secure Login From an Untrusted
                  Terminal Using Session Hijacking},
        day = {10},
        month = {November},
        year = {2010},
        abstract = {We show that session hijacking can have positive
                  applications, in particular, it can help with
                  secure login from an untrusted terminal. While
                  there are many proposals for securing a login from
                  an untrusted terminal, they all require either
                  server-side changes or client-side changes. In
                  this paper we explore a new web user
                  authentication mechanism called SessionJuggler
                  that enables user login without ever entering a
                  long-term credential on the insecure terminal.
                  SessionJuggler requires no server-side changes and
                  assumes no special software on the client beyond a
                  modern web browser. Roughly speaking, with
                  SessionJuggler users log in to a web site using a
                  modified smartphone browser and then transfer the
                  entire session, including cookies and all other
                  session state, to the terminal. The challenge is
                  to ensure that this transfer—which looks like
                  session hijacking—does not cause the web site to
                  invalidate the session. We survey session
                  hijacking defenses used by popular sites and
                  explain how SessionJuggler bypasses all these
                  defenses. Beyond session migration, SessionJuggler
                  also provides a trusted logout mechanism where the
                  trusted phone is used to terminate the session.},
        URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/763.html}
    }
    

Posted by Larry Rohrbough on 7 Dec 2010.
Groups: trust
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