Team for Research in
Ubiquitous Secure Technology

Analysis of Data-Leak Hardware Trojans in AES Cryptographic Circuits
Trey Reece

Citation
Trey Reece. "Analysis of Data-Leak Hardware Trojans in AES Cryptographic Circuits". Talk or presentation, 9, October, 2013.

Abstract
This study examines the impact of 18 hardware Trojans inserted into an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cryptographic circuit in terms of area, leakage power, and dynamic power. These Trojans were supplied from the Trust-HUB repository. This study was performed by first synthesizing the designs to 90-nm and 45-nm standard cell libraries. Then, those designs were compared to the Trojan-free circuit synthesized to the corresponding technology. All of these Trojans had very small footprints on the design in terms of area and power. Furthermore, despite all of the Trojans leaking the key in some way, the measured footprints fell over a wide range.

Electronic downloads

Citation formats  
  • HTML
    Trey Reece. <a
    href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/918.html"
    ><i>Analysis of Data-Leak Hardware Trojans in AES
    Cryptographic Circuits</i></a>, Talk or
    presentation,  9, October, 2013.
  • Plain text
    Trey Reece. "Analysis of Data-Leak Hardware Trojans in
    AES Cryptographic Circuits". Talk or presentation,  9,
    October, 2013.
  • BibTeX
    @presentation{Reece13_AnalysisOfDataLeakHardwareTrojansInAESCryptographic,
        author = {Trey Reece},
        title = {Analysis of Data-Leak Hardware Trojans in AES
                  Cryptographic Circuits},
        day = {9},
        month = {October},
        year = {2013},
        abstract = {This study examines the impact of 18 hardware
                  Trojans inserted into an AES (Advanced Encryption
                  Standard) cryptographic circuit in terms of area,
                  leakage power, and dynamic power. These Trojans
                  were supplied from the Trust-HUB repository. This
                  study was performed by first synthesizing the
                  designs to 90-nm and 45-nm standard cell
                  libraries. Then, those designs were compared to
                  the Trojan-free circuit synthesized to the
                  corresponding technology. All of these Trojans had
                  very small footprints on the design in terms of
                  area and power. Furthermore, despite all of the
                  Trojans leaking the key in some way, the measured
                  footprints fell over a wide range.},
        URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/918.html}
    }
    

Posted by Carolyn Winter on 13 Nov 2013.
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